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Abstract submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of M.App. Sc. 
Maori Participation 
in Fisheries Management Plans 
by J.M. Frater 
If tino rangatiratanga as guaranteed under the Treaty of Waitangi 
is to be met, Maori participation is considered a desirable and 
I 
necessary component in the development of Fisheries Management 
Pl1ans. 
The aim of this study is to propose a model which allows for Maori 
participation in fisheries management planning at a level equal to 
that guaranteed in the Treaty of waitangi. 
The study uses Arnstein's ladder of participation (1969) as a 
"yardstick" for comparing the different levels of participation 
which may occur. Both the level of Maori participation provided 
for in the Treaty of Waitangi and in the institutional arrangements 
(at the constitutional, collective choice and operational levels) 
in the development of the Auckland and south-East Fisheries 
Management Plans are examined. 
It· is concluded that Maori participation, as provided for in 
institutional arrangements of both Fisheries Management Plans, was 
at a level below that guaranteed in the Treaty of Waitangi. 
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Furthermore, it is recognised that any system which would allow 
tino rangatiratanga to be expressed would need to incorporate the 
values and institutions of Maori. Consequently, a bicultural model 
for fisheries management planning is proposed, incorporating the 
values and institutions of both Maori and Pakeha. 
iii 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
New Zealand's 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) , occupying 
1.2 million square nautical miles, is one of the world's largest. 
Within these waters there are around 1000 species of marine fish 
I I 
known, of which 100 are commercially significant. In 1989 New 
I 
Zealand exported fish to the value of 818 993 thousand NZ$, 
accounting for 3.6% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (OECD, 
1989) . 
New Zealand's fisheries are prized by both partners to the Treaty 
of waitangi -that is, te iwi Maori and the Crown. Both partners 
regard fisheries for their recreational, commercial, and 
conservation values. However, in addition, Maori place great 
importance on the spiritual value they believe accrues to 
fisheries. Indeed, Maori legend dictates that Maui (a hero of 
culture renowned throughout polynesia) fished up the islands of 
New Zealand. 
It is recognised that Maori have fished the waters of New Zealand 
since their arrival in New Zealand some 1000 years ago (Waitangi 
Tribunal, 1988:31-35); fish being an essential food source due to 
the lack of mammals on the islands. 
2 
In the early nineteenth century Europ'eans began to settle in New 
Zealand. Subsequently, the need for a Treaty between te iwi Maori 
and the British Crown was realised. The Treaty of Waitangi was 
signed in 1940 under which, Maori were guaranteed " ••• te tino 
rangatiratanga 0 0 ratou wenua 0 ratou kainga me 0 ratou taonga" 
fisheries being regarded as taonga (ibid.:202-205). 
However, despite these guarantees, legislation enacted by Pakeha 
governmentsl , both directly and indirectly, decreased th~ extent 
I 
of Maori fishing adtivity, culminating in the passing I of the 
Fisheries Act 1983. ' 
This Act established the Quota Management system whereby Individual 
Transferable Quota (ITQ) were allocated to fishers based on their 
previous fishing history. Therefore, the crown, upon assuming 
ownership of the fisheries, created private ownership rights for 
fish. 
Currently within fisheries legislation the Treaty of Waitangi is 
not recognised and little reference is made to Maori fishing 
rights; the sqle reference being under the section 88(2) of the 
Fisheries Act which states: 
Nothing in this Act shall affect any Maori fishing rights. 
lFor the remainder of this report the term "Pakeha" will be 
used to refer to all people of European descent settling in New 
zealand. 
'-'-~-'.'-'-"'-'-'.' .-.... -, 
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since the signing of the Treaty, there have been many appeals by 
Maori for recognition of their traditional fishing rights which 
they believe were preserved by the Treaty of Waitangi. In 
particular, the Muriwhenua, Manukau and Ngai Tahu claims to the 
Waitangi Tribunal have highlighted the extent and importance of 
fisheries to Maori. 
Therefore, management of' fisheries has been a contentious issue 
I 
in New Zealand and remains so today. At present the Ministry of 
I 
Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) is responsible for the management 
I 
of New Zeal.and's fish resources under the Fisheries Act 1983. In 
accordance with the Act, MAF is required to develop Fisheries 
Management Plans (FMPs) for each Fisheries Management Area (FMA) 
(see fig.1). It is my contention that in the development of FMPs 
for the Auckland and south-East FMAs, the degree of participation 
by Maori should be consistent with the Treaty. 
I 
Fishery Management 4 
-'~,-"" Area Boundaries 
• 
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KERMADEC 
, CEf'lJTRAL 
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- Campbell Is 
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--- Fishery Management Area 80undaries 
-- -- ',- MAFFish Regional Boundaries 
Figure 1 Fishery Management Areas in New Zealand 
Source: MAFFish 1989 
1.2 Objectives of this study 5 
It is a primary assumption of this study that the level of Maori 
participation in fisheries management planning2 is not consistent 
wi th the Treaty of Wai tangi. To investigate this assumption, 
firstly the level of participation in the management of fisheries 
resources which the Treaty guarantees to-Maori will be determined. 
Subsequently, the institutional arrangements providing for Maori 
participation (at three levels of action) in the development of the' 
Northern and south';"'East FMPs will be determined. Finally, an 
I I 
alternative model will be proposed 
I 
planning which provides for Maori 
I 
guaranteed by the Treaty. 
1.3 study approach 
for fisheries management 
I 
participation at a level 
I 
The concept of participation will be considered in chapter two 
using Arnstein's "ladder of participation" (Arnstein 1969). 'This 
ladder will provide a basis from which to assess the level of 
participation guaranteed to Maori under the Treaty, and the level 
which occurred in the development of Fisheries Management Plans. 
Consequently, chapter three will outline the guarantees of the , 
Treaty of waitangi and the level of participation guaranteed will 
be determined. Following this, the implications of the Treaty for 
2Although it is recognised that fisheries management 
planning includes both the development of FMPs and the QMS 
system; for the purposes of this report the term "fisheries 
management planning" will be used to refer specifically to the 
development of FMPs. 
-'~ _.?.)- ~~-M .. ~-.~~.~~-~ --:-- ~ :'-~-' 
I 
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I 
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future management of the fisheries resource will be examined. 
In Chapter four the nature of FMPs will be outlined and the 
institutional arrangements which exist at the constitutional, 
collective choice and operational levels will be examined. 
subsequently, using Arnstein's ladder, the institutional 
arrangements will be analysed to determine the intensity of Maori 
participation provided for at each of these levels and the outcomes 
I 
which result. 
I 
In the final chapter the factors which need to be considered to 
enable Maori to participate in the development of FMPs at a level 
guaranteed to them under the Treaty will be investigated. 
Consequently, a model for future fisheries management planning 
will be proposed. 
7 
CHAPTER 2 
PARTICIPATION 
2.1 What is participation? 
participation as defined by Nagel (1987) refers to actions through 
which ordinary members of a political system influence or attempt 
to influence outcomes. Nagel 
I 
qualifies "political system" to 
I 
include any organised structure 
I 
of power, influence and authority 
I 
(not only government) and "ordinary members" to represent all 
I I 
persons except those who perform the activities in question as a 
requirement of their principal jobs. Importantly, Nagel maintains 
that participation varies along two dimensions; extent and 
intensity. 
Participation is considered a condition required for democracy to 
exist. Democracy, as defined by Cohen (1971): 
is that system of community government in which, by and large, 
the members of a community participate, or may participate, 
directly or indirectly, in the making of decisions which affect 
them all (eohen, 1971:6) 
within different societies the breadth and depth of democracy will 
vary. Breadth refers to the proportion of the community that 
participates in determining policies, and depth, to the fullness 
or character of participation which takes place. 
Therefore, the intensity of participation maybe equated with the 
depth of democracy. It is these parameters which will be 
investigated as it was the character of Maori participation 
.- ~-" -' 
- -: ... ~:-:'- --- ~.~ 
o. c, _ ~_._, -" __ .' 
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guaranteed by the Treaty will be considered3 • 
Sherry Arnstein (1969) has developed a framework where 
participation strategies are ranked preferentially according to 
the amount of power accorded to members of the public; thereby 
categorising the intensity of participation (depth of democracy). 
Essentially, Arnstein sees participation as a struggle by the 
"have-nots to wrest away power from the "haves". That is, a means 
of redistributing power to! those who have traditionally lackedl 
power, those excluded from the political and economic processes4. I 
She maintains that: 
the heated controversy over "citizen participation", "citizen 
control", and "maximum feasible involvement of the poor," has 
been waged largely in terms of exacerbated rhetoric and 
misleading euphemisms" (Arnstein, 1969:216). 
Therefore, she offers her typology in the hope of " •. encouraging 
a more enlightened dialogue .•• " using examples from three federal 
social programmes: urban renewal, antipoverty and Model cities. 
Since 1969, Arnstein's model has been widely utilised as a tool for 
determining and assessing public participation (eg. Twight and 
Carroll (1983), Pollack (1985), Alterman (1982». 
3To achieve the objectives of this report, the extent of 
participation and the breadth of democracy will not be explored. 
4This definition and the language it uses should be taken 
in the context of the political science literature from which 
it arises. 
: I 
-:..-_ - . ~ - _", , _",_ I 
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Arnstein arranges her typology as a ladder, with each rung 
corresponding to the extent of citizen power which may exist in 
the development of a plan or programme. She identifies 8 rungs, 
from manipulation (essentially non-participation) on the lowest 
rung, to citizen control at the highest rung, where citizens are 
responsible for making decisions which affect themselves (see 
fig.2). She acknowledges that the ladder simplifies participation; 
that levels of particip&tion are not discrete, and that 
combinations of different types of participation may occur. 
However, despite these limitations, due the simplicity of l 
Arnstein's ladder it is concluded that it may be useful for 
comparing the intensity of iwi participation guaranteed by the 
Treaty; that which is provided for by institutional arrangements; 
and that which occurs in fisheries management planning. 
Hence, Arnstein's ladder of participation will be examined, 
beginning at the lowest rungs. 
2.2 Manipulation and therapy 
The lower rungs of Arnstein's ladder are better described as levels 
of non-participation rather than participation. At these levels 
power holders lead people to believe they are participating while, 
in reality, power holders aims are to "educate'" or "cure" the 
participants. 
!Z 
ij 
tJ 
lC .-•• 1 
8 
7 
6 
5 
R 
u 4 
Citizen control 
Delegated power 
I 
Part n e rs h i ~ 
I 
Placation 
Consultation 
Degrees of citizen 
power 
10 
n 
9 
s 
Degrees of tokenism 
3 Informing 
2 Therapy 
Manipulation Non-participation 
Figure 2 Arnstein's Ladder of citizen Participation 
Source: Arnstein (1969) 
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2.2.1. Manipulation 
Arnstein notes that at the level of manipulation it is common for 
advisory committees and boards to be set up by power holders to 
"educate" the participants. These committees serve as "rubber 
stamps" for power holders and enable them to verify grass roots 
involvement. Commonly these committees have no legitimate or 
effective function or power. 
2.2.2. Therapy 
, 
Arnstein d~scribes participation at the therapy l~vel as "dishonest 
and arrogant" (Arnstein, 1969: 219) • At this level participants 
appear to be involved in the planning process, but the power 
holders define the problems to be addressed. As Arnstein notes in 
her discussion concerning federal social programmes: 
The focus is on curing them of the. . pathology I rather than 
changing the racism and victimization that create their 
"pathologies" (ibid. : 218) • 
This may involve adjusting the values and attitudes of the 
"participants" to those of the greater society rather than 
addressing why they face the problems they do. 
2.3 Informing 
An increased level of participation involves informing citizens 
of their rights, responsibilities and options. This is often via 
one-way communication such as the news media, pamphlets, posters 
and responses to inquires. Commonly there will be no mechanism for 
12 
citizens to respond to decisions made by power holders and citizens 
will not have the power to negotiate. Arnstein notes "particularly 
when information is provided at a late stage in planning people 
have little opportunity to influence the program designed "for 
their benefit" (ibid.:219, my emphasis). 
2.4 Consultation and placation 
In consultative participation 
I 
however, power holders are not 
I 
into account5 • Consequently 
citizens opinions are sought, 
I 
compelled to take citizens views 
I 
citizens are powerless and 
participation may be defined as "tokenism". Usual methods to gauge 
public opinion are attitude surveys, neighbourhood meetings and 
public hearings (ibid.:219). Participation is measured according 
to how many participants come to meetings, take brochures home, or 
answer questionnaires. It is a way of the power holders to be seen 
to be concerned wi th identifying public opinion. Frequently, 
however all that results is that a lot of the participants' time 
is taken up (with little or no return) and the status guo is 
maintained. A phrase often used to describe this type of 
participation is "lip service". 
Arnstein further proposes a level of placation where participants 
have marginally more "say" than consultation. Power-holders 
5I t should be noted that the terms conSUltation and 
partnership have both beeri used by the Government, the Waitangi 
Tribunal and throughout the community to define various 
relationships between Maori and Pakeha. For the purposes of this 
study, Arnstein's definition of these terms will be considered 
apart from any other definitions which may exist. 
. ' ... ~ .. -.'-"----, 
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consider advice given to them, judge the legitimacy of it, and then 
make their decision. Complicated advisory committees, boards or 
task forces of various types may be formed. The advice may be 
taken into account if (1) it is based on a high level of 
technicality; (2) if citizens are well organised and are able to 
apply pressure to stress the importance of their views; and (3) if 
power holders ,do not hold the majority of seats in the decision 
making structure (ibid.:220). Essentially, agencies may carry out 
i I 
the actual planning with citizens having a peripheral role as 
"watchdogs" and "rubber stamps" of the planigenerated (ibid. :221). 
2.5 Partnership 
Arnstein describes partnership as "the redistribution of power 
through negotiation between citiz~ns and powerholders" (ibid. :221). 
An effective partnership in Arnstein's view is one where "citizens 
have some genuine bargaining influence over the outcome of the 
plan" (ibid.:221). Arnstein claims that: 
partnership can work effectively when there is an organised 
power-base in the community to which the citizen leaders are 
accountable; when the citizens' group has the financial 
resources to pay its leaders reasonable. honoraria for their 
time-consuming efforts; and when the group has the resources 
to hire (and fire) its own technicians, lawyers, and community 
organizers (ibid.:221). 
Furthermore, it can work effectively when " ... both parties find 
it useful to maintain the partnership" (ibid.:221) • 
.. 
• • ~ •• _ ~ • ~_J ___ ._. 
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2.6 Delegation 
At a level of participation above that of partnership, Arnstein 
proposes a level she labels delegation. At this level she proposes 
that a system of joint planning may be developed where, through 
negotiation citizens I vie}'ls may dominate decision making, regarding 
a particular plan or programme. To achieve this citizens must hold 
a majority of seats and their powers must be specified clearly . 
Under this process it is'the responsibility of the power holders 
I 
to start the bargaining process in preference to responding to 
I I 
pressure from the community. However, power holders may still have 
I I 
the right of veto as government may still have to approve the 
programme before funding is supplied. 
Arnstein notes that different forms of delegation may be 
appropriate for different communities. When grievances exist 
between citizen groups and power holders, joint planning may not 
be appropriate due to the lack of trust between the two parties. 
It is suggested that in this case, both parties would need to be 
given equal power and consequently decisions could be negotiated 
between the two parties (but with an added provision for citizen 
veto). 
A further arrangement Arnstein presents involves decentralization 
of power, where the agency may issue a subcontract to resident 
dominated groups. Under this arrangement community groups plan 
and/or operate one or more programmes. within the contract, the 
duties, responsibilities and rights of groups and a line by line 
budget are specified. It is recognised that, contracts which give 
~--
15 
community groups many responsibilities may verge on models of 
citizen control. 
2.7 citizen control 
Under conditions of citizen control the community has a degree of 
power or control to ensure: 
that its participants or residents can govern a programme or 
an insti,tution, be in full charge of policy and managerial 
aspects and be able to negotiate the conditions under which 
"outsiders" may change them (ibid.: 223) . I 
Under these arrangements no intermediaries exist between the 
community groups and its source of funds. However, the 
responsibility for awarding funds remains the responsibility of 
the state. consequently, the state gives final approval for 
projects and is held accountable for the programme. 
various arguments against community control have been suggested, 
one of which is that: 
it can turn out to be a new Mickey Mouse game for the havenots 
by allowing them to gain control, but not allowing them 
sUfficient resources to succeed (ibid.:224). 
2.8 Conclusions 
Arnstein's ladder outlines a variety of levels of participation 
which may exist. 
Ascending the ladder, the degree of citizen participation provided 
for increases, from that of non-participation - where citizens are 
• •• _. __ .J~ Je:. _.b.' 
. . - •. _·c - -', ~ 
'--.. ..,...,-.---.~ .. ---~ 
~-.. -;..~~ .... _-'. 
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lead to believe they are participating, to degrees of tokenism -
where citizens act as "rubber stamps", then on to participation -
where a certain amount of power is held by citizens. However, 
even at the top most rung, citizen control, the state retains 
ultimate control. 
Due the simplicity of Arns~ein's ladder it is considered a useful 
tool for comparing the level of participation guaranteed to te iwi 
I I 
Maori under the Treaty and the level of participation provided for 
I I 
(and which occurred) in fisheries management planning. 
I 
Before this comparision can be done, it is necessary to explore 
Treaty of waitangi, in order to clarify its guarantees. 
.. 
, . .;-~ ~ .--.~.~.~ --~ .. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE TREATY OFWAITANGI 
3.1 The signing 
In 1840 the Treaty of Waitangi was signed by the British Crown and 
te iwi Maori. The text of the Treaty was drafted in English, with 
subsequent translation of the text into Maori by a local 
missionary, Henry Williams. The Treaty was distributed throughout 
kew Zealand and the issues it addressed were discussed and debated. 
II
As a result over 500 chiefs signed the Maori text and 39 the 
English text (Orange, 1988:16). 
3.2. The text 
The Treaty is divided into 3 articles. Under Article I of the 
English version of the text, Maori ceded " ... all rights and powers 
of sovereigntyll to the Crown (see Appendix 1). In Article II, 
Maori were guaranteed the " .•. full exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of [their] Lands and Estates, Forests and Fisheries". 
Article III granted Maori Royal protection and all rights and 
privileges of British subjects. 
Under Article I of the Maori text, the word "kawanatanga II 
(governorship) is used to give an equivalent to sovereignty. 
Article II of the Maori text guarantees " •.• te tino rangatiratanga 
(full authority) 0 0 ratou wenua 0 ratou kainga me 0 ratou taonga 
katoa" (lands, homes and things prized). 
18 
Therefore, both texts stipulated the rights Maori were to retain 
and those which the Crown was to acquire. However interpretation 
of the nature of these rights depends on which text is read. 
currently many researchers agree that the Maori text of the Treaty 
should have precedence over the English text (Kelsey, 1989: 11, 
Jackson, 1989:43, Gray et aI, 1988). 
3.3 Reasons why the Maori text should have precedence 
I 
A principal reason given why the Maori text should have precedence 
is that all Maori chiefs (except those who signed at Waikato Heads) 
signed the Maori text (Orange, 1988:16). 
Under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, the Waitangi Tribunal was 
required to have regard to both the Maori and the English versions 
of the Treaty, and to: 
.•• determinethe meaning and effect of the Treaty as embodied 
in the two texts and to decide issues raised by the differences 
between them (Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975). 
Subsequently, the Tribunal investigated the relative positions of 
the two texts in the proceedings of the Motunui claim. Applying the 
rules of Treaty interpretation, accepted in both international and 
British common law, the Tribunal concluded that where there was no 
conflict between the texts, each should be read to complement the 
other: 
However it is submitted that should any question arise of which 
text should prevail the Maori text should be treated as the 
prime reference (Waitangi Tribunal, 1983:57) 
Consequently, the Tribunal recommended that the rule of contra 
, 
····-.·.1 
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proferentum should be applied. Under this rule if an ambiguity 
exists "a provision should be construed against the party which 
drafted or proposed that provision" (ibid.:57). 
Due to the prominence of the Maori text it is considered 
appropriate to examine what is meant by rangatiratanga and 
kawanatanga. 
I 
3.4 Rangatiratanga 
I 
The w~itangi Tribunal was given power, unde~ the Treaty of waitangi 
Act 1975, to interpret the Treaty and investigate claims based on 
the "practical application" of the "principles of the Treaty of 
waitangi" (Kelsey, 1990:60). Despite the strict rules within which 
the Tribunal is confined, the Tribunal has attempted to resolve 
differences between the two texts. Throughout claims the Tribunal 
_._, has consistently recommended recognition of mana Maori and tribal 
authority. In the Orakei claim the Tribunal: 
.•• refused to usurp the mana of the claimants, not only to 
possess but to control and manage those taonga guaranteed them 
in accordance with their preferences ... (Kelsey, 1989:35). 
Subsequently, in the Muriwhenua claim the Tribunal recognised: 
••• when the Treaty promised Maori New Zealanders possession of 
their fisheries it meant .•• that they would have possession that 
was "full, exclusive and undisturbed" (Temm 1990:83). 
and in the Manukau claim: 
•.• the Crown's guarantee in the Treaty was not only a guarantee 
of possession in respect of fisheries but also a guarantee of 
the "authority to control, that is to say, of rangatiratanga and 
• _'-L- _____ "_" __ 
... ~- .... -. ~ ... ~ --...:- ~ 
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mana (Temm 1990:52). 
Thus in each of these claims the Tribunal agreed that the Treaty 
I 
guaranteed te iwi Maori the authority to possess, manage and 
control resources and taonga which they wished to retain ie. 
rangatiratanga over their resources. The Tribunal recognises that 
preserving iwi self management and active protection of taonga are 
necessary elements of rec9gnising rangatiratanga. 
I 
Furthermore, in the Motunui claim the I Tribunal found te tino 
ran~atiratanga to mean "the highest chieftainship" or indeed "the 
sovereignty of their lands" (Waitangi Tribunal, 1983: 59) • This 
finding highlights the need to determine the precise meaning of 
kawanatanga, as it was equated with . sovereignty' in the English 
text, yet in this context it is likened to rangatiratanga. 
3.5 Kawanatanga 
On the grounds that the Maori text has precedence the meaning 
inferred by 'kawanatanga' should be considered in preference to 
. sovereignty' • To the Maori, kawanatanga means the right to 
govern. In 1840, Maori were familiar with the use of the term 
kawana to mean Governor. 
According to a group known as the Kia Mohio Kia Marama Trust, 
kawanatanga gave: 
the British Governor, power on behalf of the British Crown to 
provide for 'law and order' and security through a Governor, 
not an authorised settler Government, who was inferior to and 
< " .,' 0..,. ~_~ • __ , 
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subject to te tino rangatiratanga, and remains so (Kia Mohio 
Kia Marama Trust, 1989:69) 
In its reports the Tribunal has addressed the meaning of 
kawanatanga conveyed to Maori. 
In the Kaituna claim the Tribunal recognised: 
... the limited authority of 'kawanatanga' to maintain law, 
ord~r and security in a manner which saffguarded the exercise 
of tino rangatiratanga (Waitangi Tribunal, 1984:18-19). 
and fur~her to this in the Manukau claim, thr Tribunal recognised 
that kawanatanga was: 
... something less than the sovereignty (or absolute authority) 
ceded in the English text. As used in the Treaty it means the 
authority to make law for the good order and security of the 
country but subj ect to an undertaking to protect particular 
Maori interests (Waitangi Tribunal, 1985:90) 
Consequently, these findings (along with others) refer to the 
nature of a relationship between rangatiratanga and kawanatanga; 
a concept which subsequently will be examined further. 
3.6 The interaction of rangatiratanga and kawanatanga 
The most controversial aspect of the Treaty concerns the degree 
of overlap of the rights and responsibilities of the two Treaty 
partners, ie. where kawanatanga and rangatiratanga overlap. 
Historically, the relationship between kawanatanga and 
rangatiratanga has varied: however, characteristically it has been 
~-. - :--.'- -'.'-' ... ' -
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one of tension. 
The Tribunal has examined the relationship, perhaps most thoroughly 
in the Muriwhenua claim. Boast (1989) restates the Tribunal's 
approach as the following set of propositions: 
1) Neither kawanatanga nor rangatiratanga are absolute rights. 
They qualify and restrict one another; the Crown's kawanatanga 
~s restricted by the tribes' rangat~ratanga, and viceversa. 
Thus the Treaty, if it is ever implemented fully, must operate rS a constitutional fetter on parliamrntary sovereignty. 
f) Sometimes, however, kawanatanga can10verride rangatiratanga. 
3) In terms of subject-matter, one area in which the Crown's 
kawanatanga can override tribal rangatiratanga is that of 
conservation.- Laws binding on all for the purpose of 
conservation are not contrary to the Treaty. 
4) However, before such a limitation is within the terms of the 
Treaty (and is in that sense "constitutional") it must be 
"absolutely necessary" for conservation, and it must be shown 
that controls over those who lack Treaty rights have been 
applied first. Only if regulation of non-Treaty interests has 
proved insufficient can rangatiratanga be overridden in the 
interests of conservation" (Boast, 1989:58)6. 
These propositions isolate conservation as an issue which 
government should have jurisdiction over and fail to recognise 
that tribal rangatiratanga will also incorporate concern for 
conservation and sustainability. 
6 The findings of the Tribunal should be viewed in the 
context of the political climate of the time. As the Manukau 
and Kaituna claim were heard before the New Zealand Maori Council 
v Her Majesty's Attorney General 1987 (commonly known as the SOE 
case) the Tribunal's findings were more bold. However, in the 
SOE case it was stated that the Tribunal could only make 
recommendations in keeping with the principles of the Treaty as 
determined by the judges of the High Court (Kelsey, 1990). 
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In their findings the Tribunal recognises the right of Maori to 
exercise tino rangatiratanga, with the condition that the Crown 
possesses ultimate power concerning the management and use of 
resources currently held in their possession. These findings are 
predictable due to the political constraints within which the 
Tribunal operates. consequently, they differ from the relationship 
between kawanatanga and rangatiratanga as prescribed by the Kia 
Mohio Kia Marama Trust (1989), where 
i 
the power of the Government to maintain law and order is inferior 
I 
to and subject to the exercise of tino rangatiratanga. 
I 
In conclusion, it would seem that for tino rangatiratanga, as 
guaranteed under the Treaty to be returned to Maori, provision 
must exist for Maori to manage those resources (as stipulated in 
the Treaty) in the manner they prefer. In order to fulfil this 
guarantee in its entirety, Crown kawanatanga cannot override tribal 
l 
rangatiratanga. Indeed, in the Kaituna Claim it was recognised 
that the chiefs would never have signed the Treaty if they believed 
that their rangatiratanga would be usurped by the Crown (Waitangi 
Tribunal, 1984:18-19). 
Perhaps Arnstein I s ladder of participation may provide further 
insights into the level of participation the Treaty guaranteed to 
Maori. 
3.7 The Treaty and participation 
The Treaty has been interpreted in a variety of ways and different 
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degrees of participation by Maori have been suggested. Partnership 
is a term frequently used to prescribe a relationship which the two 
Treaty partners should develop. There exists many different 
perceptions of what participation means. 
The level of participation Arnstein defines as partnership is one 
where the community negotiates with power-holders for power. She 
describes this as the first level of participation where there is 
I I 
any real redistribution of power. Furthermore, she maintains that 
I I 
powerholders will only concede power when they find it useful to 
I I 
do so. However, tino rangatiratanga guaranteed to te iwi Maori 
under the Treaty exceeds that level of participation Arnstein 
defines as partnership. 
The Waitangi Tribunal's interpretation of the Treaty (particularly 
evident in the Muriwhenua report, 1988) suggests participation at 
the level Arnstein describes as delegation. This level provides 
for Maori participation at a level which exceeds that she defines 
as partnership but below that guaranteed in the Treaty. 
At the level of delegation power-holders have responsibility to 
start the bargaining process; power-holders have the right of veto 
(eg. regarding conservation issues); procedures for communi ty 
participation are set up by Government; and distribution of 
finances is the responsibility of Government. 
These characteristics reflected in the Tribunal's 
recommendations and in the Government's partnership response - Te 
Urupare Rangapu, but at this level of participation the community 
J"'-_'-"--'_-'J>_,J 
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still relies on the state for finance: consequently the State holds 
the balance of power. 
Examples of this type of . participation' are evident in many policy 
directives in society. A useful example is the introduction of . Tu 
tangata' into the Maori Affairs Department, a policy directed at 
developing a "people-oriented, people managed societyll (Spoonley, 
1988:79). Some funding and power was given to local communities, 
I 
but the success of this policy initiative was compromised as the 
Department was accountable to Goverhment and relied on Government 
for " ••• substantial financial suppo~t [which had] not always been 
forthcoming II (ibid.: 80). consequently, important policy questions 
on resources were still decided by the Department. Furthermore, 
the Maori people saw the Department as an agent of the Crown and 
not as an agent of the tangata whenua. consequently, they did not 
support the Department's initiatives. As the current Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries is similarly an agent of the Crown, it 
may also lack the support from Maori as its policies primarily 
reflect those of the Crown. 
Arnstein recognises that "no one in the nation has absolute 
control .•• " (Arnstein, 1969:223). Therefore, even at the highest 
rung of her ladder of participation, citizen control, the State 
maintains power; a situation which as previously discussed, fails 
to allow tribal rangatiratanga to be exercised. 
It is certain that any initiatives by Government to restore tino 
rangatiratanga will be within Arnstein's spectrum, as to recommend 
otherwise would undermine the power of the State. However, for 
--. -".'.-, ..... ".: .... - ~ 
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tino rangatiratanga to be exercised by Maori, ultimate power cannot 
remain the responsibility of the other Treaty partner. Instead it 
is considered that power should be shared by Maori and Pakeha. 
consequently, Maori participation should exceed the top rung of 
Arnstein's ladder. Therefore, it would seem inappropriate to 
recognise the policy framework of one Treaty partner and not that 
of the other when managing a resource. 
3.8 Implications for management of the fisheries resource 
I I 
The implications of appropriate recognition of the Treaty with 
respect to the management of New Zealand 's· ·fisheries resources are 
vast; most notably with respect to the recognition of tino 
rangatiratanga. It is the opinion of some Maori, that for tino 
rangatiratanga to be returned, tribal structures which 
traditionally were used to govern the use of resources within a 
tribes control should be recognised (Jackson 1989). Presently 
Government actions to return some authority to Maori have assumed 
that the iwi should be the basis of Maori control (see the Runanga 
Iwi Act 1990). However, it is recognised that traditionally, 
resources were managed by those closest to the resource ie. at the 
hapu or whanau level (a subject which will be examined further in 
chapter 5). 
Under the Runanga Iwi Act provision has been made for the 
establishment of iwi authorities to represent the interests and 
responsibilities of iwi. with respect to fisheries it should be 
noted that iwi boundaries are, in most cases, incompatible with 
.'-'-'~'. ",'."- ;"--.-. 
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current Fisheries Management Area boundaries. Therefore, any 
structure which provides for tribal rangatiratanga to be exercised 
will require these boundaries to be revised. 
Recognition of Maori rangatiratanga involves far more than "a duty 
to consult". Furthermore, it would seem that present institutional 
structures, based on Pakeha values and beliefs, will be unable to 
accommodate this. Therefore, to fully recognise rangatiratanga it 
I 
is necessary 
and beliefs, 
, 
for a Maori policy framework, based on Maori values 
I 
to operate alongside that of Pakeha. 
I 
The level of Maori participation in fisheries management planning 
will now be examined to determine whether this is compatible with 
that guaranteed by the Treaty. 
I 
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CHAPTER 4 
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLANS 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that the development of 
fisheries management plans in New Zealand is a process in which 
Maori should participate, if guarantees of the Treaty are to be 
met. 
Kiser and Ostrum, in their analysis of institutions, recognise 3 
I 
distinct levels of analysis: the operational level, which explains 
I 
the world of action; the collective choice level which explains the 
world of authoritative decision-making; and lastly the 
constitutional level which explains the design of collective choice 
mechanisms (Kiser and Ostrum, 1982: 184). Kiser and ostrum maintain 
that the same working parts make up each of the 3 levels (supra.) 
(see appendix 2). They examine how institutional arrangements at 
each of these levels affect the degree, type and distribution of 
outcomes. 
Therefore, Kiser and Ostrum's framework provides a means of 
categorising the institutional arrangements for a particular 
process. Consequently, it is a useful framework to categorise the 
institutional arrangements in fisheries management planning. 
Subsequently, this facilitates analysis of the level of Maori 
participation provided for by institutions concerning fisheries 
management using Arnstein's ladder. 
It is proposed that due to institutional arrangements at the 
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constitutional, collective and operational levels Maori have not 
participated at a level guaranteed to them under the Treaty. In 
order to establish this, first it is necessary to identify the 
purpose and nature of FMPs as defined at the constitutional level 
through legislation. 
4.1. The nature of Fisheries Management Plans 
Before the establishment of the Fisheries Act 1983, fisheries in 
New Zealand were managed through I a variety of restrictions and 
regulations introduced by the Fisheries Act 1908. Following 1963, 
with the de-licensing of the fishing industry and the removal of 
export restrictions on fish, commercial fishing activity increased 
to a level where inshore fin-fish stocks were over-fished. In 
response, the Fisheries Act 1983 was enacted which provided for a 
comprehensive and integrated approach to fisheries management, in 
particular through the formulation of FMPs. The aim of FMPs was 
to provide a coordinated system of management which incorporated 
concepts from overseas and from land planning: an integral part of 
which was the input by the public via objections and submissions. 
However, due to the length of time required to produce a 
comprehensive FMP, the Quota Management System (QMS) was introduced 
through amendment to the Fisheries Act in 1986. This was done in 
an attempt to provide immediate action to limit the depletion of 
the inshore fishery., 
) 
The QMS was concerned primarily with 
addressing over-fishing problems by imposing limits on commercial 
catches. As a result, the role of FMPs evolved to complement the 
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QMS. Consequently, FMPs deal not only with issues concerning over-
fishing but with more specific fishery issues not covered by the 
Quota Management System. FMPs may include both fin-fish and 
shellfish, however provision exists for separate plans to be 
developed for certain fish types if considered necessary. This is 
decided on the basis of the size of the fisheries. 
4.1.1 Fisheries Managemen't Areas 
New Zealand's fisheries waters have been divided into 7 Fishery 
I 
Management Areas (FMAs) (see fig.1). The Gazette notice of April 
1984 (Appendix 3) outlines the precise extent of these areas and 
species which are excluded from the jurisdiction of the plan7 • 
originally, with the introduction of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
in 1978, New Zealand's fishery was divided into 8 areas to make 
surveillance and management easier. These areas were based on the 
fishing patterns of the foreign vessels that had operated around 
New Zealand (Boyce, 1986:6). However, as a result of the Fisheries 
Act 1983, boundaries for the FMAs were set with the intent to take 
more account of the distribution of fish stocks. 
subsequently, the institutional arrangements at the constitutional 
level which concern fisheries management planning will be 
considered. 
7 These include those species subject to foreign fishing 
craft operations, barracouta, hake, hoki, ling, orange roughy, 
oreo dory, silver warehou, squid and six species of tuna. 
. -,,::. -" _ .. '_. - ... _. -' -' ~ 
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4.2 Institutional arrangements at the constitutional level 
Fisheries Management Plans were established under section 5 of the 
Fisheries Act 1983. The purpose of Fisheries Management Plans, as 
defined by section 4 of the Fisheries Act 1983, is "to conserve, 
enhance, protect, allocate and manage the fishery resources within 
New Zealand fisheries waters". In addition, the Act establishes 
Fishery Management Areas, sets out guidelines 
t d ,I 'b'l't developmen , an ass1gns respons1 1 1 Y for fisheries 
I 
and for preparing FMPs to MAF. National fisheries 
for their 
1 
management 
I 
management 
objectives are contained in provisions of the Fisheries Act and the 
Maori Fisheries Act 1989. It is intended that management 
objectives and strategies of FMPs should be consistent with 
national objectives, initiatives and policies and should deal with 
issues specific to the region. 
The Maori Fisheries Act was established in response to Maori 
demands for restoration of traditional tribal fisheries (in 
I 
particular the Muriwhenua claim, 1988). The Adt is primarily 
concerned with Maori fishery matters and seeks to: 
(1) make better provision for the recognition of Maori fishery 
rights secured by the Treaty of waitangii and 
(2) facilitate the entry of Maori into, and the development by 
Maori of, the business and activity of fishing (MAFFisheries, 
1990:92) 
A provision of the Act to achieve these aims is the establishment 
of taiapure (local fishing areas) to be controlled by local iwi. 
Under the Act, regulations for taiapure may override the provisions 
of the FMPi thus providing local iwi with a greater amount of 
• .• J.", 
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authority over fisheries resources defined as taiapure. However, 
this authority is to a large extent usurped as MAF retains overall 
control8• 
In addition, under the Act, 10% of the total allowable catch has 
been allocated to Maori over a 4 year period. This is to be 
transferred by the Crown lto a Maori Fisheries Commission who 
administers the funds.' 
I 
However, despite provisions of the Act, no direct reference is 
I 
made to FMPs. 
In addition, MAF maintains that the general management approach 
outlined by FMPs will be adopted when addressing the relevant 
provisions of legislation such as the Marine Reserves Act and the 
Marine Farming Act 1971. 
To enable the level of Maori partic"ipation· provided for in 
institutional arrangements at the constitutional level to be 
assessed, the process for fisheries management planning as provided 
for by the Fisheries Act will be examined in more depth. 
8Local iwi are required to identify taiapure (or rahui 
areas) they consider important to MAF. MAF policy stipulates 
that taiapure are to be identified for specific reasons and 
purposes. These are classified generally as wahi tapu and may 
allow fish to be taken only for local use, seasonally or may 
prevent fish being taken altogether. As a result of MAF's 
fisheries management role, it is responsible for the 
classification of areas as taiapure. 
- .-.----~-~- ~~-1 
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assessed, the process for fisheries management planning as provided 
for by the Fisheries Act will be examined in more depth. 
4.2.1 The planning process 
Who participates? 
As outlined in figure 3 provision exists under section 7 of the 
Fisheries Act - 1986 for Fishery Management Advisory Committees 
(FISHMAC) to be appointed for each FMA for" ••• the purposes of 
preparing proposed plans and giving advice in relation to operative 
plans for each FMA" (section 7). These committees: 
shall have as chairman [sic] an officer of the Ministry ••. and 
may include members representing commercial, processing, 
wholesaling, retailing, recreational, Maori and consumer 
interests in the area relating to fishing (section 7(2» 
In addition, Fisheries Liaison Committees (FLCs),and in some cases 
Harbour Liaison committees, may be established to discuss local 
Declnratio"J of fisheries management areas by Minister 
of Fisheries (Section 5 of Fisheries Act). 
Appointment of Fisheries Management Advisory Committee (FISHMAC) 
for each Fishery MnnaRement Area (Section 7). 
'f 
1 Preparation of draft fishery management 
plan (or ammendment or review) (FMP) in consultatIOn 
with user groupsand public authorities (Section 6). Reviews ..... lind -
Consideration of draft FMP by FISHMAC 
and Liason Committee. 
Ammendments 
Revision of dran FMP as necessary to form 
proposed FM.P ----------' 
'f 
1 Submission of proposed FMP to Minister (Section 8 (2». 
Minister agrees with FM.P in principle 
'f 
J! Public notification of proposed FM.P (Section 8 (2). (3). 
Public objections to or submisions on proposed FMP 
invited (Section 9 (I» . ..:..:.... _____ ----l 
'f 3 monlh~ 
4 a;' Referral of objections 
and submissions to 
Fisheries Authority. 
..... 
4bi Consideration of submissions and objections by 
. Director-General ofMAF (Section 9 (3». 
'f . Recommendations to Minister of Fisheries in 
Authority may bold 
hearings to consider 
objections and 
respect of submissions and objections (Section 9 (3». 
Decision by Minister on recommendations (Section 9 (7». 
submissions (Section 9 (4». Any amendments to proposed FMP as a result of 
Ministers decision. ~~___________ ----l 
'f 
5 Referral of proposed plan and any amendments to 
Minister (Section 8 (4». 
Approval oC FM.P by Minister (Section 8 (6». 
Notification oC approved FM.P in gllzette (Section 8 (6). 
6,a.. Appeal to planning tribunal on approved FMP 
~ 'f 
Right of objection to or submission on IIpproved plan to planning 
tribunal within 28 days oC date of notification oCapproved plan 
(Seclion 10 (I». 
Public enquiry held by planning tribunal 10 consider all objections 
and submissions (Section 10 (2». 
6b, Minister recommends to Govemer-
General the makingby Order in Council 
of Regulations bringing FMP into Coree 
~ and giving effect to controls specified in FMP. ~ 
'f 
Govemer-General makes Regulations. 
Planning tribunal makes report and recommendations to Minister 
Section 10 (6». 
Minister makes decision on tribunal recommendations 
(Section 10 (7». 
~ 
Approved FMP 
as nrnmended 
or 
Figure 3 Main steps 
Management Plan. 
.. 
Appeal is 
declined 
in the preparation of a Fishery 
The numbers in the upper left hand corner of each box 
correspond to those in the text. 
Source: MAFFish 1989 
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fisheries issues 9 
MAF is responsible for drafting the plan and controlling the 
process. lOuring preparation of the draft fishery management plan 
MAF is required to consult and have regard to the views and 
responsibilities of user groups (including Maori) and public 
authorities as the Minister considers appropriate (Fisheries Act 
1983 (6». 
I I 
zOnce the Minister agrees with the draft plan in principle, it is 
I I 
made available for public inspection. 3Submissions and objections 
on the plan are accepted within a 3 month period from the date of 
the plan's release. 4aFollowihg this period the Director-General 
considers the submissions and objections and may refer matters 
raised to the Fisheries Authority. 
The Authority was established under section 13 of the Act. It 
consists of 5 members, including a member appointed after 
consultation with the Fishing Industry Board and another after 
consultation with the New Zealand Maori Council. The appointment 
of the remaining 3 members is at the Minister's discretion. 
The Fisheries Authority has the power to conduct public hearings 
to enable the writers of submissions and objections to present 
their views. Subsequently, the Authority makes recommendations 
9The basis for membership of either of these committees is 
the same as for FISHMACs, as discussed earlier. 
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,~·_C" to the Minister who makes decisions based on these recommendations. 
__ -_::..--'--'-"-'_-1.-_,i 
4blnstead of referring objections and submissions to the Fisheries 
Authority, the Director-General of MAF (following consideration of 
submissions and objections) may make recommendations directly to 
the Minister of Fisheries. The Minister ultimately makes decisions 
on recommendations and may' decide on amendments to the proposed 
FMP. 
I I 
5The proposed plan is forwarded to the Minister for approval with 
the addition of any amendments necessary. The public are notified 
of the approved plan via the Gazette and a date is specified after 
which the plan becomes operative. 
6bwith the Minister's recommendations, the Governor General makes 
regulations to bring the FMP into force. These regulations may 
be specific to the FMA to which the plan responds or may be 
applicable nationally. 6b Provision exists for any objectors, or 
people who make su~missions who disagree with the approved plan, 
to appeal to the Planning Tribunal. The Tribunal conducts a public 
enquiry, considers all objections and submissions and makes 
recommendations to the Minister. The Minister may decide an 
amendment to the approved plan is necessary or may decide the 
appeal is not warranted. The appellants only further recourse is 
if there has been a breach of the law in which case an appeal may 
be made to the High Court. 
_·_.h. _ .. -_ ~ 
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Plan implementation 
FMPs are implemented by regulations made under section 10 A of the 
Fisheries Act or under existing regulations. Any regulations made 
under section 10 A or 11 of the Act will override any previous 
regulations if they conflict. The Fisheries Regulations 1986 apply 
nationally and relate to both commercial and amateur fishing. 
I 
Amendments to plans 
Plans may be amended, suspended or revoked in accordance with 
sections 6 and 8 of the Act. Under the Act the Minister is 
required to have regard for and consult public authorities, 
acclimatisation societies, the Fishing industry Board and other 
interest and user groups in order to amend, suspend or revoke 
plans. In addition, the Minister is required to consult with the 
Fishing Industry Board or any appropriate acclimatisation society 
before any emergency amendments to the plan or emergency 
restrictions are imposed (section 11(1» 10. 
Conclusions 
Institutional arrangements at the constitutional level as outlined 
above are followed in the formulation of all FMPs. However, 
10Any decisions made may only remain in effect for a period 
of 90 days. However, this may be extended for one further 90 day 
period if desired (section 11(3». 
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different regions may possess different aims, goals, purposes or 
be guided by different principles. For this reason, different 
levels of Maori participation may be provided for in institutional 
arrangements in different FMAs. These will subsequently be 
examined, for both the Auckland and south-Eastern FMAs, to 
determine the level of Maori participation provided for at the 
collective choice level and that which actually occurred at the 
operational level. 
4.3 The Auckland process 
The draft FMP for the AucklandFMP (AFMP) was released on 14 
December 1989 in accordance with the standard process for 
development of FMPs as outlined in figure 3. The plan covers the 
area from Tirua Point on the west coast, clockwise to Cape Runaway 
in tne east, with mean high water mark as the landward boundary and 
the seaward limit being the extent of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) (see fig.1). It is intended that the AFMP, when implemented, 
should give direction for fisheries management for a 5 year period, 
after which it will be reviewed and, if necessary, amended. The 
aims, goals, purpos~, management strategies for Maori as a user 
group and guiding principles of the plan provide an idea of MAF's 
commitment to Maori rights in fisheries management. 
39 
4.3.1. Institutional arrangements for Maori participation at the 
collective choice level 
Aim 
The overall aim of the Proposed Auckland FMP is: 
To ensure that the fishery resources of the Auckland Fishery 
Management Area are ~onserved, enhanced, protected, allocated 
and managed for the maximum benefit of present and future 
generations (MAFFish, rL989:4)11. 
Goals 
A number of goals are stated in the plan, one of which is "to 
manage fisheries ... in ways which are responsive to the needs of 
Maori" (ibid.:4) (my emphasis). 
stated management strategies for Maori as a user group 
concerning management responsibilities and consultation with 
respect to Maori fisheries, MAF policy states that the objective 
is: 
to devise management systems which are in accord with principles 
for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi (MAFFish, 1989:80). 
Concerning consultation, it is maintained that MAF intends: 
to develop with the Maori Community, a consultative process 
which provides for sharing of information and encourages a joint 
approach to resolution of management issues (ibid.:82) (my 
emphasis). 
llThe proposed Auckland FMP deals only with fin-fish. It 
is intended that management strategies for shellfish will be 
appended at a later date. 
,C_"_"'_>k __ ':" "I 
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In addition, the need for a "two-sided network" where each party 
(ie. Maori and the Ministry) "is able to advise the other about 
fishery management issues and problems and jointly work towards 
achieving solutions" is recognised (supra). 
In order to adopt a formalised consultative structure and to 
develop more informal linkages wi th the Maori communi ty , MAF 
proposes: 
(1) establishing a Maori Fisheries Panel for the Auckland FMA 
I I 
comprising representatives from each of the Iwi Authorities within 
I I 
the Auckland FMA to provide a regular point of contact between 
Maori and the Ministry; 
(2) continuation of Maori representation on Auckland FISHMAC and 
FLCs; and 
(3) Ministry representation, if invited, on any formalised bodies 
established by the Maori community to deal with fisheries matters. 
However, included in the proposed plan is an introductory statement 
concerning Maori fisheries. It states that: 
this Fishery Management Plan contains various references and 
management proposals which relate to Maori fisheries matters. 
This has been done because of the desire of the Ministry of 
Agricul ture and Fisheries to produce a plan in which all 
interests in fishery resources (my emphasis) (in particular 
commercial, recreational and Maori) are considered in relation 
to one another (MAFFish, 1989). 
It continues, that inclusion of material relevant to Maori 
fisheries may seem inappropriate to some due to ongoing efforts 
to resolve Maori Fisheries issues via the Maori Fisheries Bill. 
However: 
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" ••• management proposals, relating to Maori fisheries, are 
intended to indicate in broad terms only, actions the Ministry 
wishes to take to achieve a balanced use of fishery resources 
(emphasis mine) . 
purpose 
rhe plan's stated purpose is to: 
provide a long-term framework for the management and 
administration of fisher,ies in the greater Auckland region 
(ibid.:2). 
I 
Further to this it is maintained in the plan that the process seeks 
., . I . h . to reflect the commun1ty s des1res for f1s er1es management through 
its involvement in the process. 
I • • 
It 1S 1ntended that management 
measures be developed to bring benefits to as many interest and 
user groups as possible while not unduly disadvantaging any 
particular group. 
Guiding principles 
The following three guiding principles have been adopted as a basis 
for the management strategies proposed in the plan: 
1. Maintenance of the sustainability of fishery resources is 
of primary importance. 
2. The concept of a "reasonable share" needs to guide decisions 
on access to, and allocation of, fisheries resources. 
3. As well as biological considerations, both the economic and 
social implications of management strategies need to be 
identified before decisions on implementation are made 
(ibid.:5). 
committees established 
As a result of MAF policy the Auckland FISHMAC was established in 
--'.-'-:'-'~~~' -
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1984 following provisions of the Fisheries Act 1983. In addition 
3 non-statutory Fisheries Liaison committees were set up in 
Northland, Auckland and the Bay of Plenty and informal Harbour 
Liaison committees were established to discuss issues relating to 
the Kaipara, Manukau and Raglan harbours. 
conclusions 
Essentially, any commitment MAF has towards Maori rights to 
participate in fisheries man'agement planning are within a Pakeha 
I 
policy framework. It would beem that the prime intention of the 
plan is to balance the inter~sts of all interest groups. I It does 
not intend to give Maori interests priority over other interests 
(in line with fisheries legislation) nor does it encourage or 
require the Crown to relinquish any of its power. 
Subsequently, following Kiser and ostrum's framework, the level 
of participation provided for at the operational level will be 
examined. 
4.3.2. Institutional arrangements at the operational level 
and outcomes 
Work towards the AFMP started in early 1984 with the preparation 
of a series of introductory papers12. Thes.e papers were intended 
to " •.• inform user and interest groups about the FMP process, the 
12The degree of Maori participation at the operational level 
is difficult to determine as information is, for the most part, 
not documented. 
" •••••• -_-~._ ••• '"0 '-', 
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status of fisheries in the Auckland region and options for future 
management of the fisheries" (Handford, pers. corom.). During the 
following two years, the introduction of Individual Transferable 
Quotas (ITQ) was discussed. This included consultation with user 
groups (in particular the fishing industry) and iwi representatives 
at a national fisheries hui held in Wellington (supra.). The aims 
of the hui were to identify a network of iwi contacts and areas 
with fisheries of special significance to iwi. 
During these same years, the Mutiwhenua fisheries claim was lodged 
with the waitangi Tribunal. 1he Tribunal found that under the 
Treaty of Waitangi, Maori were guaranteed full protection for their 
fishing activities. Furthermore, the Quota Management System was 
found to be in fundamental conflict with the Treaty's principles 
and terms (Waitangi, 1988:239-240, 296-297). 
It was intended to proceed with the AFMP in three phases: phase I 
representing the release of a proposed FMP; phase II involving 
investigations and discussions on a range of issues (see appendix 
4); and phase III the formulation of a final plan (MAFFish 1986). 
Under the circumstances, the Ministry decided not to deal with 
Maori fisheries issues, within the context of the FMP, until the 
Government had made a decision regarding Maori access to fisheries 
resources (Handford, pers. corom.). Consequently, no detailed 
programme for iwi participation was set up for phase I of the 
Auckland FMP and it was considered that Maori fisheries may have 
required discussion in a third phase. 
'-.--,-.-:::-~j-- •. --.. --.~ 
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Despite these developments, Maori participation was provided for; 
firstly through Maori representation on the Auckland FISHMAC 
(presently elected through contact with the Iwi Transition Agencies 
within the Auckland FMA) and on the Whangarei, Auckland and 
Tauranga FLCs. However, in July 1990 there were no Maori 
representatives on FISHMAC13 • Of the FLCs, no Maori representatives 
were known in either Tattranga or Auckland, however, one memper 
representing Maori existe~ in Whangarei (Roberts, pers. corom.)i 
In the second instance Maori participation was provided for through 
discussion with iwi regarding local fisheries issues (eg. in the 
Bay of Islands, Manukau Harbour,and Ohiwa harbour). It is said 
that as a result of these discussions, several issues were 
recognised by iwi as being of particular concern and were 
identified for further investigation within the context of the FMP 
(Handford, pers. corom.). MAF maintains that discussions with Maori 
concerning the management of fisheries are ongoing and recognise 
the need for further consultation to occur (Fanselow, pers. comm. 
1990). However, recently a legal opinion was sought by MAF on the 
degree of consultation they should pursue. As a result of these 
investigation, it was concluded that the Fisheries Act did not 
provide for further consultation with Maori in the fisheries 
management planning process (ibid.). 
13MAF Fisheries commented that negotiations had begun in 
order to obtain five tribal representatives who would represent 
Maori interests on the Auckland FISHMAC (Fanselow, pers. comm. 
1990). 
.. 
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Additionally, through the objection/submission process, of a total 
of 900 submissions received, 8 were received from individuals or 
groups who identified themselves as Maori - including one extensive 
submission from the Ngaitai Iwi Authority of 21 pages. This 
perhaps indicates the inappropriate nature of the 
objection/submission process to provide for Maori participation in 
the planning process. 
I 
Therefore , it would seem that actions at the operational level 
I I 
were consistent with those at the collective choice level, as the 
I I 
extent of Maori participation would indicate that all interests in 
fishery resources were considered, of which Maori were but one. 
To better define the degree of participation at the three levels 
of action reviewed above (and in order to allow comparison between. 
the three levels) Arnstein's ladder will be used as a measuring 
stick' • 
4.3.3 An analysis of institutional arrangements at the three 
levels of action 
Maori participation at the constitutional and collective choice 
levels 
The process prescribed in the Fisheries Act allows for 
participation by Maori through: 
1) participation in the draft FMP following appointment to 
FISHMAC'Si 
2) the public objection and submission process; 
... - -~ ... , -' ." . ". -.... -' --. 
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3) the Fisheries Authority (through the member elected through 
consultation with the New Zealand Maori council); and 
4) through the process of Appeal. 
The only participating body which requires a Maori representative 
is the Fisheries Authority (a body whose power has been greatly 
reduced due to the limited number of species remaining outside the 
QMS system). However, it is recognised that the member appointed 
I I 
may not be representative of Maori (indeed it wOQld be impossible 
I I 
for 1 member to represent Maori throughout the FMA). 
I I 
1 In Maoridom those closest to the resource are traditionally 
responsible for its management. Subsequently, a system whereby a 
few individuals "represent" Maori on committees is inappropriate. 
Furthermore, under these arrangements Maori remain but one of many 
members with equal voting powers. Perhaps the fact which overrides 
all others is that the FMP process is controlled by the Crown. As 
such it is based on Pakeha values and beliefs and is essentially 
mono-cultural. Consequently, Maori representation on committees 
is minimal and only a small percentage of Maori offer objections 
and submissions on the plan. \ 
As Arnstein contends, at this level: 
power holders are not compelled to take citizens views into 
account (Arnstein, 1969:220). 
The power holder (MAF) considers advice received, judges the 
legitimacy of it and then makes recommendations to the Minister 
-_-_1,..-_,..._-_:..-_".-... __ 
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who makes a decision. In the FMP process the "complicated advisory 
committees" (Arnstein, 1969:220) - in this case FISHMACs, FLCs and 
HLCs - are set up and consulted during preparation of the draft 
plan. However, the Minister's agreement with the proposed FMP is 
still necessary. Further to this, representation of Maori on these 
committees is not a requirement. Consequently, Maori participation 
through these committees may be lacking, negligible, or 
alternatively may not be "representative" (as discussed above). 
I 
1 I 
The taiapure process may provide for Maori participation at a 
I 
higher level. 
I 
The characteristics of this system parallel a level 
of participation Arnstein terms delegation. At this level, local 
iwi are issued with a sub-contract to operate a programme. Under 
this system the duties, rights and responsibilities and a line-by -
line budget are specified by the state. 
However, al though the taiapure process may provide for Maori 
participation at a higher level on Arnstein's ladder, in general, 
Maori participation at the constitutional level is equivalent to 
the fifth (and possibly the forth) rung, that is placation and 
consultation. 
Maori participation at the operational level 
The early stages of the AFMP could be classified by Arnstein's 
ladder as 'informing', due to the nature of the introductory papers 
which were prepared, and the lack of a mechanism for citizens 
(including Maori) to respond. 
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AS attempts to set up an iwi participation programme were 
forestalled by discussions concerning Maori access to fisheries 
resources, participation by Maori was limited to discussion with 
local iwi and through submissions and objections (of which very 
.•.. few were received). This type of participation characterises that 
Arnstein defines as consultation where citizens opinions are 
sought, however, power ho~ders are not compelled to take citiz~ns 
views into account. 
Therefore, at the operational level it would appear that despite 
provisions made, Maori representation on advisory committees was 
lacking. Possibly for reasons as outlined above. Consequently, 
although these mechanisms established by MAF at the collective 
choice level may have allowed for Maori participation at a level 
t Arnstein describes as placation, at the operational level Maori 
r,;_-
, .. , ..... "~ participation was at a lower level of conSUltation or even 
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informing . 
4.4 The south-East process 
The formulation of the draft south-East FMP (SEFMP) was influenced 
by debate over Maori 
Fisheries Act 1989. 
officially released. 
fishing rights and the subsequent Maori 
Although complete, the plan has yet to be 
It includes all waters on the east coast of 
the South Island between Clarence Point, north of Kaikoura, and 
south of Dunedin (see fig .1) . The 
·-:"'·','-"-',-"'::.---'--1 
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landward boundary (as for the AFMP) is mean high water mark and 
seaward the area extends to the limit of the 200 mile EEZ. 
Excluded from the plan is the Chatham Island Shellfishery, for 
which a separate plan will be prepared. 
As for the AFMP, the goals, aims, purpose and guiding principles 
of the plan are set out. Examination of these characteristics 
allow the level of commitment by MAFFisheries to Maori 
participation to be determined. In addition, determination of the 
, " 
level of Maori participation provided for in institutions at the 
I i 
operational level, allows an analysis of the level of participation 
which actually occurred in the formulation of the plan. 
4.4.1. Institutional arrangements for Maori participation at the 
collective choice level 
purpose 
The purpose of the south-East Fishery Management plan mirrors that 
of the Auckland Fishery management Plan. That is to: 
provide a long-term framework for the management and 
administration and enforcement of fisheries resources in the 
South-East Fishery Management Area (SEFMA) (MAF Fisheries 1990) . 
Guiding principles 
In many respects the two plans are similar. However, in the South-
East plan an additional guiding principle has been added. This 
principle states that: 
---
-'-'- ,.,----.:::...~----'-., 
~~:;..-------~-"'-'.-., ---""--! 
L-_ 
50 
Fisheries Management shall have regard to the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi (MAF Fisheries 1990:5) (my emphasis). 
Goals 
In addition, a goal proposed for management in the SEFMA is to: 
recognise Maori cultural values and interests, and to provide 
for these in the management of Fishery resources in the SEFMA. 
This goal contrasts with the goal of theAFMP, to manage fisheries 
resources; "in ways which are responsive to the needs of 
I 
Maori"(Auckland FMA,1989:4). 
! 
I 
However, in the plan MAF maintains that it seeks community 
involvement in order to reflect community desires for fisheries 
management and furthermore, publ ic comment on obj ecti ves and 
policies for the management of valuable fishery resources (my 
emphasis) . 
Scope of the plan 
It is recognised that the SEFMP has a clear role to play in 
complementing the provisions of the Maori Fisheries Act 1989 and 
the Fisheries Act 1983; and in recognising the activities of Maori. 
In this context it is proposed that once taiapure have been 
established under the Maori Fisheries Act, they may be incorporated 
into the SEFMP if the Taiapure Management committee requests. 
Furthermore, in the plan it is concluded that: 
the FMP has a clear role to address the provision [of the Maori 
Fisheries Act, concerning quota allocation] and ~o facilitate 
-- - ~~ ".:"", .. - .. 
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Maori involvement in the fishery management planning process 
(ibid:93) (my emphasis) • 
Importantly it is noted in the plan that: 
within the context of fisheries management, Government has 
undertaken [to] promote decision making in the machinery of 
government, in areas of importance to Maori communities, which 
provide opportunities for Maori people to actively participate, 
on jointly agreed terms, in such policy formulation and service 
delivery. (supra.) (my emphasis). 
Therefore, MAF recognises that the status of the tangata whenua 
I I 
needs to be reflected in fisheries management: the two most 
relevant Iprinciples of the Treaty being ~angatiratanga and 
I • • I 
cooperation as defined by the Crown (1b1d:93). 
J 
In line with these principles, the objectives of the SEFMP are to: 
1) support and assist the implementation of appropriate 
management strategies which integrate traditional and current 
fisheries management practices; and, 
2) to continue a consultative process with the Maori community 
which provides for the sharing of information and encourages a 
joint approach to the resolution of management issues (ibid. 5). 
It is anticipated that this can be achieved by: 
1) strengthening the relationship with Maori consultative bodies 
and the communities they represent; 
2) supporting and having regard for Iwi Management Plans 
concerning fisheries; and 
3) facilitating the establishment of taiapure and their 
incorporation into the SEFMP. 
MAF policy has endeavoured to recognise the principles of the 
Treaty ofWaitangi (notably rangatiratanga and cooperation) through 
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a system known as the Hui/Tangi permit system and through any 
consultation which takes place. Under the permit system a local 
kaumatua may permit the collection of seafood for a hui or tangi, 
without the need to consult MAF. 
In the SEFMA, a Maori Fishery committee was established by MAF to 
consult with MAF and provide Maori views on how fisheries of the 
SEFMA should be managed. 
I 
The Committee was comprised of 
representatives from each of the eight Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board 
I I 
electoral districts (fig.4) and the Maori Fisheries Consultant for 
I I 
MAF. It was expected that a system of consultation would occur 
where local runanga (councils), formed opinions which would then 
be discussed by regionalrunanga. These opinions would then be 
communicated by representatives on the Maori Fishery Committee to 
MAF. 
The Committees functions were to: 
1) guide and support the Maori Fisheries consultant; 
2) devise a programme to identify rahui and taiapure areas; 
3) identify fishery issues of special concern to Maori 
4) represent Maori at Fishery Liaison Committees and FISHMACs; 
5) effectively represent Maori fisheries to Government and to 
the public; and 
6) report progress to the Iwi Authority (ibid:94). 
The Committee's relationship with the south-East FISHMAC is 
important in terms of the formulation of the FMP as the FISHMAC 
is expected to give advice on the preparation and revision of 
plans. Therefore, FISHMAC is seen as a primary forum for MAF and 
Maori groups to investigate and resolve matters of mutual interest. 
In addition, Maori representation on FLCs in Kaikoura, 
· . ~.':'.' ' ... -' ~ 
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Figure 4 Te Runanga 0 Ngai Tahu he Ika - Accountability chart 
Source: based on Teirney (pers. corom.) 
Christchurch, Timaru and Dunedin also influence FISHMAC activities. 
It is envisaged that both Maori and MAF "... advise each other 
about fishery management issues and problems as they arise and 
jointly work towards achieving solutions" (ibid:94). With this 
- .. ---------._-." -. , 
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level of commitment by MAF at the collective choice level it is 
appropriate to determine the institutional arrangements at the 
operational level to see whether the commitment has been followed 
through. 
4.4.2 Institutional arrangements at the operational level 
As at the collective choice level, institutional arrangements for 
I 
Maori participation in the SEFMP at the operational level were 
influenced by the passing 
I 
of the Maori Fisheries Act 1989. 
.', I 
consequently, al though based on the Auckland FMP, it could be 
expected that a greater degree of participation could have 
occurred. 
Consultation with all interested groups occurred in the preparation 
of the plan over a 2 week period in June 1990 (Teirney, pers. 
comm.). This conSUltation included a two day hui at Waihau marae 
where features of the FMP were discussed with the Maori Fisheries 
committee (te runanga 0 Ngai Tahu hi ika). 
Additionally, each of the 2 FISHMACs for the SEFMA has two Maori 
representatives (however, generally it is noted that at any meeting 
only one representative will be present (ibid.». These 
representatives have been invited to attend Fisheries Liaison 
committee (FLC) meetings in Kaikoura, Timaru, Christchurch and 
Dunedin but generally have not attended. This lack of attendance 
is thought to have occurred as discussion at FLC meetings has 
tended to focus on commercial fishing (ibid.) and has not 
'-.~-'---- - ..... '--~-'--"'1 
55 
considered the wider issues pertaining to fisheries14 • 
4.4.3. An analysis of institutional arrangements at two levels of 
action 
Maori partioipation at the oolleotive ohoioe and operational level 
The formulation of the Maori Fisheries committee for the SEFMA 
I 
suggests a commitment enabling Maori participation beyond that 
required under tJe Fisheries Act 1983 in the formulatfon of FMPs. 
Due to the organised nature of the Maori Fisheries committee and 
the fact that its members are accountable to the runanga they 
represent, the committee may be able to apply pressure on MAF to 
stress the importance of its views. However, the degree of 
participation will be affected by the degree of funding allocated 
to the committee. In addition, as the Committee's representation 
on FISHMACs and FLCs is far exceeded by that of other fisheries 
users (notably commercial fishers) Maori representation on these 
committees will be relatively minor and frequently overridden. 
Although the representatives on the Maori Fisheries Committee may 
represent their runanga (which could be said to represent an 
"organised power base" (Arnstein, 1969: 221» the Committee does 
14 At present there are moves to restructure FISHMACs to 
better represent the range of fishery users (Teirney, pers. 
comm.). 
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not satisfy any of the other requirements which Arnstein labels 
"partnership". That is, the committee does not have the financial 
resources to pay its leaders reasonable honorarium or hire and fire 
its own technicians, lawyers and organisers. 
For these reasons, Maori participation in the SEFMP may be likened 
to that of "watch dogs" and "rubber stamp" roles typical of a level 
of participation Arnstein ttescribes as placation. 
As was suggested for the AFMP, it woutd seem unlikely for the 
I • I 
committee's advice to be taken l.nto account for the following 
reasons: 
1) It is not likely that Maori values pertaining to fisheries will 
be based on a high degree of technical knowledge or certainty which 
would generally be the basis for fisheries management decisions 
made by MAF; and 
2) the Maori Fishery Committee's representation on FISHMAC will 
be minimal compared to that of other user groups. 
consequently, despite the fact that the Maori Fishery Committee 
may represent a well organised group, the views of its 
representatives are unlikely to be taken into account. 
This is highlighted by the fact that the Committee is to provide 
" ••• Maori views on how fisheries of the SEFMA are to be managed", 
and not what is to be managed and by whom. Therefore, as with the 
AFMP, MAF policies do not hand over any 'real' power to Maori as 
was guaranteed under the Treaty. This has occurred to a small 
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extent through the Hui/Tangi permit system and the taiapure system. 
However, these systems alone do not go far enough in returning 
tribal rangatiratanga. 
4.5 Summary - see figure 5 
The main findings of this chapter (as shown in figure 5) are that 
institutional arrangements at the constitutional level allow for 
I i 
Maori participation at a level comparable to that which Arnstein 
terms ~lacation (or perhaps the lower level'of consultation). At 
the le~el of placation, citizen's views are ~ought, however, power 
holders are not compelled to take these views into account. 
For the Auckland FMP, institutional arrangements for Maori 
participation at the collective choice level parallel those 
provided for at the constitutional level. However, at the 
operational level, institutional arrangements provide for Maori 
participation at a level Arnstein defines as consultation or even 
the lower level of informing. 
For the SEFMP, institutional arrangements for Maori participation 
at the collective choice and operational levels typify 
participation at a level Arnstein terms placation where 
participants have marginally more "say" than at the level of 
consultation but ultimately citizens perform a peripheral role as 
"watch-dogs" and "rubber stamps". Consequently, it can be 
concluded that at all three levels of action (for both the Auckland 
and South-East FMPs) institutional arrangements for Maori 
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participation in FMPs only provide for participation in the form 
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Figure 5 summary of the levels of participation provided for by 
insti tutional arrangements at the three levels of action for the 
AFMP and SEFMP. 
of tokenism (see fig.2). 
Thus, provision does not exist for Maori to participate at levels 
Arnstein recognises as offering a degree of citizen power, or for 
tino rangatiratanga to be practised as guaranteed by the Treaty of 
Waitangi. 
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Consequently, in chapter 5, a bicultural approach to fisheries 
management planning which allows tino rangatiratanga to be 
exercised w;ill be explored. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A BICULTURAL APPROACH 
5.1. Introduction 
Different societies possess different frameworks by which they 
develop policies to manage resources available to them. The nature 
of these frameworks has been examined by some policy analysts who 
! I 
have developed models of how the policy process within a particular 
I , 
society works. 
I 
Daniel Bromley (1987) suggests one such model. He suggests that 
the customs, norms and values of a given society are reflected in 
the set of rules which apply. Subsequently, he maintains that from 
these rules a system of organisation is developed, as shown in 
Values (Preferences) 
~ 
Rul,es (Institutions) 
l 
~ 
Outcomes 
Fiqure 6 Bromley's Model 
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figure 6. 
On the basis of Bromley's model it seems appropriate first to gain 
some understanding of the differences in values of Maori and 
Pakeha. Subsequently, the significance of values systems will be 
examined in general and salient features of both the Maori and 
Pakeha value systems will be considered. 
I 
Despi te arguments which dispute Bromley' s framework15 , it may 
provide a starting point with which to ekamine Maori and Pakeha 
I I 
policy frameworks and consequently reveal any differences between 
the two, frameworks which may exist. 
5.2 Value .systems 
Particularly in recent years Maori have been requested to define 
their values in disputes between Maori and Pakeha (notably in 
claims brought before the waitangi Tribunal). However, the 
necessity to identify Pakeha values has not been recognised and 
consequently they have not been examined to anywhere near the same 
extent. 
It has been suggested that the lack of demand for specification 
15Bromley' s model is based on an ideological view of the 
world. This conclusion ~y be reached (as according to some 
authors) causality may operate in the opposite direction to that 
proposed by Bromley (Pollak, 1985:18, Bartlett, pers. corom.). 
If this idea is accepted then, as a result of the outcomes, 
insti tutions may be changed and subsequently the values or 
preferences of society may be altered. 
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of Pakeha values is due to the position Pakeha hold in New Zealand 
as the holders of power. Consequently, Pakeha values have 
underlain all policies and legislation and as with any mono-
cultural society, these values tend to go un-questioned. 
Furthermore, the outcomes they induce are regarded as lithe norm" 
rather than a product of the values of the society. However, in 
order to compare Maori and Pakeha policy frameworks these values 
must be unearthed. 
I I 
It should be recognised that the values of a society change with 
I I 
time. These changes may be due to a variety of factors including 
the interaction with societies possessing other values systems. 
Notably, due to assimilationist policies which prevailed in New 
Zealand until the 1960s, Maori have acquired many of the values 
common to Pakeha. In addition, Pakeha have acquired some values 
characteristic of Maori (although it could be concluded to a much 
lesser extent) 16. In the following analysis an attempt will be made 
to identify some of the salient values of Pakeha. 
5.2.1 The Pakeha value system 
I 
Different value systems and pe~ceptions of those systems exist 
within Pakeha society, so any analysis of Pakeha values will not 
be universally applicable. 
\ 
16It is inaccurate to generalise too broadly, as the degree 
of acquisition of values from other cultures will vary greatly 
between individuals. 
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However, in general Pakeha society is based on secular materialism, 
where the material secular world is placed before and above that 
of the spiritual and the non-material. As implied, this does not 
involve the total rejection of things of the soul. However, the 
material world of science is given priority and is the basis of 
society. This idea is demonstrated by the doctrine of humanism, 
which Ehrenfeld (1978) maintains is at the heart of present western 
culture. Humanism is a belief in a way of life centred on human 
I 
interests and values. This philos~phy: 
regards man [sic] as a natJral object and asserts the essential 
digni ty and worth of man, and his capaci ty to achieve sel f 
realization through the us~ of reason and the scientific method 
(Ehrenfeld, 1978:5) 
As such, it rej ects the supernatural and is based instead on 
supreme faith in human reason and the ability to control our own 
minds, bodies and the world outside. Ehrenfeld adds that what 
humans can't control they predict. 
Furthermore, it is maintained that an additional feature of western 
societies is that: 
the progress of humanity has appeared to depend on establishing 
and maintaining a strict order through the perfection of 
administrative control; ie. the mastery of nature has depended 
upon a mastery of human nature (Torgerson, 1990:119) 
Therefor~, both Ehrenfeld and Torgerson support the notion that 
in the western world the spiritual world is overridden, by the 
secular material world. These views are congruent with those of 
Max Weber who writes of the 'protestant ethic' and the . spirit of 
capitalism' (Weber, 1983). Weber specifies values characteristic 
.. -----------.-.-:---~--- ' 
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of western society which stem from these two bases. 
He maintains that through the 'spirit of capitalism', profit is 
sought rationally and systematically. According to this doctrine 
the earning of money is seen as a result and expression of virtue 
and proficiency. Therefore, the capitalist system demands a 
devotion to making money: this is associated with an acquisitive 
manner of life. In order for the individual to increase their 
I 
capital, punctuality, justice, industry, frugality and honesty are 
considered useful attributes. . I 
The characteristics of these doctrines emphasise the status of the 
individual, rather than the group. This value is perpetuated by 
equalitarianism where each individual is considered to have equal 
rights. This in turn is upheld by the concept of majoritarianism, 
where as a consequence of the equality of individuals, that group 
with the greatest number rule. As a consequence of these two 
concepts, the status (or position) of particular groups which may 
exist in society are not acknowledged. 
Democracy is a further value of Pakeha society; however, as 
" discussed in chapter two, it may vary greatly in its depth and 
breadth. The process of democracy itself incorporates both 
majoritarianism and equalitarianism. However, it encompasses a 
further value concerning the right to participate in the decision 
making within society. As Nagel (1987) maintains, this may range 
from voting for a leader to entrust with policy making (indirect 
democracy) to a system where individuals themselves decide matters 
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of policy (direct democracy). Whatever type of democracy exists, 
.; a system of voting is used and different policy makers are elected 
-... ~.".-.- - . 
.. '.' __ '_0"" __ -_" __ -' 
with time. 
It is recognised that many more values underlay Pakeha society. 
However, it is thought that secular materialism, equalitarianism, 
majoritarianism, individualism and democratism form the basis. 
These ideas will be useful to highlight some of the main points of 
I 
conflict between Maori and Pakeha society. 
I 
5.2.2. The Maori value system in comparison 
Essentially, Maori values are derived from the three kits of 
knowledge: 
Te Kete Tuari- contains scientific knowledge - Matauranga 
Te Kete Aronui - contains celestial and cosmogenic information 
designed to benefit human kind - Whakaaro 
Te Kete Tuatea - comprises all rituals, acts and formulae with 
all things on earth and the cosmos - Ritenga and Kawa 
/ 
central to the value system of Maori is wairuatanga, whereby 
everything in Maori society has a spiritual dimension (fig.7). 
From these three kits the values as depicted in figure 7 are 
derived. Under the concept of whanaungatanga Maori are united by 
kinship linkages. This concept assists people to determine who, 
on different occasions, stands in authority. Therefore, it gives 
0-.-. "_"_" .... ' - .". -. "0 '~I 
- __ ~. 0". ___ .'_: 
Whanaungatanga Manaakitanga 
~ / 
Wairuatanga 
Rangaliralanga / __ ._______ ~___ otahitanga 
Figure 7 Salient Maori values 
Source: Ritchie (undated) 
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rise to rangat~ratanga ie. the process of holding ~nd exercising 
status within an event or a community. In Maori society respect 
and subsequently leadership status, may be gained through 
inheritance, peer acceptance or by an individual proving their 
ability with respect to an issue. This contrasts with Pakeha 
society where a system of voting is used more frequently to 
determine leadership. 
Although within Maori society the individual status of particular 
people is recognised, the concept of kotahitanga (unity through 
consensus) is important. Under this process everyone's mana is 
recognised and as ayonsequence of whanaungatanga a sense of unity 
is evoked. Essentially, individuals find their identity as part 
of a group and exist to serve collective group purposes; in 
contrast to western society where in general it is maintained that 
individuals form groups for personal gain (Mulgan, 1989:62). A 
further concept of note is that of manaakitanga - reciprocal 
sharing. This concept pertains to the allocation of resources on 
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the basis of need. 
5.2.3 Differences in the two value systems 
The major difference in the two value systems lie in the relative 
importance of the spiritual as opposed to the secular, material 
world, This fundamental difference has resulted in much conflict 
between the two peoples, examples of which are evident in all 
I 
claims brought before the Waitangi Tribunal. 
I 
Importantly, whereas Pakeha may feel able to control nature; for 
Maori nature is the origin of life and thus deserves respect17 • 
Additionally, Maori society is not based on the values of 
capitalism which encourage individualism, capitalism and material 
acquisition. As a consequence, those attributes thought useful for 
-~ .. , .. ,~~. achieving these goals are not considered important by Maori for the 
same reasons. 
Furthermore, systems of leadership and decision making differ 
between the two groups, primarily due to the status conferred on 
individuals. It is the combination of these differences which 
gives rise to two different policy frameworks. 
17However, as Torgerson notes: 
in the aftermath of modern industrialisation nature appears more 
complex and sensitive - in a sense more recalcitrant to human 
designs (Torgerson, 1990:120) • 
...... ~,._ .. ~.,consequently, the western view that nature is controllable may 
have lost some strength in 17 recent years. 
, ,_, .... F "'. ~ •• _._ •• ; 
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5.3 Policy frameworks 
To enable a model for the process of fisheries management to be 
developed which provides te iwi Maori with rangatiratanga, as 
guaranteed under the Treaty of Waitangi, a detailed analysis of 
the policy process is considered unnecessary. However, a 
comparison of possible policy frameworks for Maori and Pakeha 
(based on their respective I value systems) may provide insight~ 
into the factors which need to be considered in order to establisH 
a system whereby tribal rangatiratanga is exercised. 
5.3.1 A Pakeha policy framework based on Bromley 
Essentially the framework proposed by Bromley has 3 levels: policy, 
organisation and operation (fig.8). At the policy level rules are 
discussed and empowered through legislation and enforced by the 
judicial system. Policies are then passed on to organisations 
where bureaucrats format, formalise and implement these rules. 
These rules then influence individuals and groupings of individuals 
at the operational level which act on the resource base. 
Bromley maintains that institutions link the organisational levels 
together. Furthermore, he proposes that the nature of these 
institutions is dependent on four dimensions: 
1) the normative - based on the norms of society; 
2) the political ie. the values the majority subscribe to; 
3) the economic - whereby an economic surplus is produced so that 
,. ... ".'" ," ..... -----.~--' SOCIAL DIMENSIONALITIES 
Normative Values 
Political 
E I , conomlc 
Society 
Values and Beliefs 
/ 
legislation 
POLICY ! " judiciary 
ORGANISATION - executive 
, ' 
Political 
I 
Anthropogenic 
! ' d' 'd" I OPERATIONAL ~ In IVI ua s 
! .......... firms 
RESOURCE BASE 
...------INFRASTRUCTURE 
Expected Outcomes costs/benefits 
Figure 8 A Pakeha Policy Framework 
Source: Saunders (1990) 
a service sector may operate; and 
~ 
Actual Outcomes 
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4) the anthropogenic - where individuals in society develop skills 
and competencies. 
Under this framework Bromley proposes that if outcomes are not 
compatible with the values of the society then through a system 
of feedback citizens can attempt to induce the state to 
" ••. redefine the institutional arrangements within which they must 
.. --'-' 
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act and interact" (Anderson and Hide, 1988: 6) • Therefore, the 
conclusion Bromley draws from his framework is that the policy 
process is merely a means of achieving outcomes. Consequently, 
once outcomes are determined, the policy process can be designed 
to produce these outcomes. 
Furthermore, in contrast it could be maintained that the policy 
process itself produces out6omes (see Fn15). However, in this 
study it is not intended to determine which approach is correct 
but rather to attempt to dete~ine differences which exist between 
I 
the Maori and Pakeha policy frameworks by using models. 
5.3.2 The Maori policy framework 
In Maori society tikanga (policy) is decided by those closest to 
the.resource base ie. by the whanau (Saunders, 1990, Gray, pers. 
corom.) (fig.9). The whanau have the role of caretakers, users and 
are the repositories of knowledge regarding the resource. 
Therefore, the whanau determines the ways, rules, and conditions 
of proper conduct. 
Tikanga may be imposed at the level of the hapu (regional), iwi 
(central) or possibly the waka level (comprising many iwi). 
Following the formulation of tikanga, authority is allocated at 
the level of ritenqa (which is synonymous with the executive level) 
and is subsequently operationalised at the level of kawa by 
protocols and rules of the tribal level. Additionally all levels 
,.-_." " ......... ~ -:-.......... -; 
"_.-:~" ,"".,.,._ .:. I 
Te Ao Tangata 
Tu tangata 
Nga mahi taonga 
Rangatiratanga 
Tikanga 
whakaaro 
TE AO TUROA 
I TOar I 
(Ka Puta Ki Waho) 
Outcomes 
t 
Ritenga 
Tikanga 
/ '" 
I Waka, Iwi, Hapu, Whanau .1 
TE AO MAORI 
Fiqure 9 A Maori Policy Framework 
Source: Saunders (1990) 
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matauranga 
of the policy process operate within the following social 
dimensions: 
1) tutangata - pertaining to the anthropogenic dimension; 
2) nga mahi taonga (working the resources) - similar to the 
economic dimension in a Pakeha policy framework; 
3) rangatiratanga - the political dimension; and 
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4) tikanga - based on the norms of society, that is, on whakaaro 
"""'--"-1 and matauranga. 
.,~~~- -~ ~--, 
>"---,"- ~-'-- .... --...-...... ~-~-~ 
Therefore, the Maori policy framework proposed by Saunders and 
Gray reflects a "bottom up" approach. 
5.3.3 The differences in the two frameworks and the consequences 
If Bromley's model (fig.G) is taken as a basis, differences in the 
I 
Maori policy framework proposed by Gray and Saunders and that 
I 
proposed to depict that of Pakeha by Bromley, stem from the two 
Maori Values 
Maori 
Policy 
Framework 
(Fig. 8) 
Ka Puta Ki 
Waho-outcomes 
Shared Values 
negotiated 
Pakeha Values 
Pakeha 
Policy 
Framework 
(Fig. 7) 
Outcomes 
Figure 10 The Process as Recommended by Gray and Saunders 
Source: Gray and Saunders (in prep.) 
73 
different value systems. As a result of these values the Maori 
policy process exemplifies a "bottom up" process, in contrast to 
the Pakeha process which Bromley maintains is "top down" (supra.). 
The direction of the process relates primarily to the level where 
policy/tikanga is made in the two systems and how it is 
implemented. However, whereas in Pakeha society policy is 
manifested in legislation, in Maoridom it is manifested in rituals 
and protocols (ritenga and kawa). 
I 
Due to differences which exist between the Maori and Pakeha policy 
I I 
frameworks it is considered that attempts to facilitate Maori 
authority over resources guaranteed under the Treaty, by 
incorporating them into any of the stages within the Pakeha 
framework are inadequate, pointless and illustrate ignorance of 
the existence of two differing systems of policy formulation. 
Consequently, the values and institutional arrangements of policy 
"~'-""- processes of both Maori and Pakeha need to influence the fisheries 
management planning in New Zealand. To achieve this, a system 
whereby policy outcomes are produced which are compatible with the 
values and institutional arrangements of policy processes of both 
Maori and Pakeha is necessary. Such a system may be termed 
bicultural. 
5.4 A bicultural model for fisheries management planning 
To ensure that guarantees for Maori participation in the management 
of fisheries resources made under Article II of the Treaty are met, 
both partners need to have responsibilities at all levels of the 
-
'" • r _ • __ -.'_ ~ ••• ~ 
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policy process in fisheries management planning. It is suggested 
that both policy frameworks could operate in society, each of which 
would produce outcomes (fig .10). At the level of outcomes, exchange 
in the form of negotiation and/or mediation between Maori and 
Pakeha could occur. Through this process it would be hoped 
outcomes could result which would be compatible with the values of 
both Maori and Pakeha . This concept is reflected in the findings 
of the Orakei report where it was concluded: 
in the Maori view, 'unity is sought by respecting differ~nces, 
and the separate mr,na of the different groups or famil}es to 
which we individually belong. It is seen as more important to 
respect difference~ and negotiate the bonds that bridge them 
(Waitangi Tribunal 1987: 171) • I 
The establishment of a system for iwi management of resources 
assumes that iwi have ownership rights to the resource (a question 
which is currently under the jurisdiction of the Waitangi 
Tribunal) • Consequently, the process whereby ownership is 
established may need revision. Furthermore, in order for a Maori 
policy framework to operate, sufficient financial resources and 
people skills will be necessary. For these reasons it is 
recognised that a bicultural model for fisheries management 
planning should be established in a determined but incremental 
manner. 
. . 
.'-__ -.:..'--o"-.!.-.:.-_ 
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Appendix 1 The Treaty of Waitangi 
• 
TE TIRITI 0 I 
AITANG · 
HE KUPU WHAKA T AXI I Ko Wildtoria te Kuini 0 Ingarani 
I lana mahara alawai Id nga rangatira me nga hapii 0 Nu Tirani i 
lana hlahia hold Ida tohungia Id a ratou 0 ratou rangatiratanga 
me to ratou wenua a Ida mau tonu hold te rango ki a ratou me 
te Atanoho hoki kua wakaaro ia he mea tilea kia tulrua mai'letahi 
rangatira hei kai wakarile ki nga Tangala Maori 0 Nu Tirani Ida 
walcaaetia e nga rangatira Maori te Kawanatanga 0 te /Wini ki nga 
wahiJcatoa 0 te wenua nei me nga motu - na te mea hoki he 
tokomaha ke nga tangala 0 tona lwi kua noho ki tenei wenua a e 
haere mai nei. . I 
Na leo te Kuini J~ hiahia ana Ida wakaritea te Kawanatanga Ida 
kaua ai n!la kino •. e pUla mai Id te tanllata Maori ki te Pikeha e 
noho lUre kore aria. I 
Na kua pai te Kuini Ida tukua ahau a Wiremu Hopihono he 
Kapitana I te Roiara Nawi he Kawana mo nga wahl katoa 0 Nu 
Tirani i tukua aianei a mua atu ki te Kuini e mea atu ana ia ki nga 
rangatira 0 te wakaminenga 0 nga hapii 0 Nu T1rani me era rangat· 
ira atu enei lUre ka Korerotia nei. 
KO TE TUATAHI I Ko nga rangatira 0 te Wakawinenga me 
ngii rangatira kaloa hold. kihai i uru Id taua Wakaminenga. ka tuku 
rawa atu Id te Kuini 0 Ingarangi ake lonu atu Ie Kawanatanga 
kaloa 0 0 riilou wenua. 
I KO TE TUARUA I Ko Ie Kulni 0 Ingarangi ka wakarite ka 
wakaae Id nga rangatira. ki nga hapii. Id nga tangata italoa 0 Nu 
Tirani. Ie tino rangatiratanga 0 0 ratou wenua 0 rilou kainga me 
o ralou laonga katoa. Otiia ko nga rangatira ote Wakaminenga 
me nga rangatira kaloa atu. ka tuku kile Kuini Ie hokonga 0 era 
willi wenua e pai ai Ie tangata nona Ie wenua. Id te ritenga 0 Ie 
utu e whakaritea ai e ratou ko Ie kaihoko e meatia nei e Ie Kuini 
hei kaihoko mona. I 
I KO TE TUATORU I Hei whakaritenga mal hold tenei mo t~ 
wakaaelanga Id Ie Kawanatanga 0 te Kuini. Ka tiakina e te Kuinl 
o Ingarangi nga tangata Maori kaloa 0 Nu T1rani. Ka tukua ki a 
ralou nga likanga kaloa rile tahi ke ana mea Id nga tangata ~ 
Ingarang!. . -
Na. ko malOU ko nga rangalira e Ie Wakaminenga a nga hapu 
o Nu T1rani ka hUlhui nei ki Waitangi ko matou hold ko nga ran· 
gatira 0 Nu T1rani ka kite nei i te ritenga 0 enei kupu. Ka tangohia 
ka wakaaetia kaloalia e malOu. Koia ka lohungia ai 0 malOu ingoa 
o malOu tohu. 
Ka mealia lenei ki Waitangi i te ono 0 ngi ra 0 Pepueri i Ie tau 
kotahi mano. e waru rau e wa Ie kau 0 10 latou Ariki. 
• TREATYOFWAlTANGI:ALITERALENGLISHTRANSL-\TlONOFTHE~L\ORITEXT .1---, 
I 
Signed at Waitangi February 1840. and afterwards by about 500 chiefs. 
VICTORIA. the Queen of England. in her kind (gra. 
cious) thoughtfulness 10 the Chiefs and Hapus of 
New Zealand. and her desire to preserve 10 them 
their chieftainship and their land. and that peace 
and quietness may be kept with them. because a 
great number of the people of her tribe have sel· 
t1et1 in this country. and (more) will come. has 
thbughl il right 10 send a chief (an officer) as one 
who will make a stalement 10 (negotiale with) 
Maori people of New Zealand. lei the Maori chiefs 
accept the governorship (KAWANATANGA) of the 
I nus IS TIlE FIRST I 
The Chie" 01 the Conlederauon. 
and all these chIeis who have nOI 
joined in thaI Conlederauon S,ve 
UplO the Queen 01 EnSland lor ever 
all the Governorship 
(KAWANATAN<lA) 01 their lands. 
I nus IS TIlE SECOND I 
The Queen 01 England agrees and 
consents 110 SiW! 110 the Chiels. 
1Iapus. and all the people 01 New 
Ualand \he lull chlelt&inship 
(r&II!IatlraWl!l&) 01 their lando. 
their villages and all their 
. poaesaions \ laOna&: everythinB 
1haI" held precious Ibullhe Chle" 
Jive 10 \he Queen the purchasinB 
ollhose pieces 01 land which the 
owner is willlnB 10 aell.lUbjecllo 
the &rnII8JIIII 01 paymenl which 
will be qreed 10 by _ and the 
pwchaoer who will be appointed 
by the Queen lor the purpose 01 
buytng lor her. 
Queen over all parts of this country and the Is· 
lands. Now. the Queen desires 10 arrange the gov· 
ernorship lest evils should come 10 the Maori 
people and the Europeans who are living here 
without law. Now. the Queen has been pleased 10 
send me .. William Hobson. a Captain in the Royal 
Navy to be Governor for all places of New Zealand 
which are now given up or which shall be given 
up 10 the Queen. And she says 10 the Chiels of 
the Confederation 01 the Hapus of New Zealand 
and the other chiefs. these are the laws spoken oi. 
I TIllS IS THE THIRD I 
ThIs is the anan~emenl for the 
consenllO the sovemorshipol the 
Queen. The Queen Will protect all 
the Maon people 01 New Zealand. 
and give them all the same rights 
as those 01 the people 01 England. 
WlWAM HOBSON. Co/Uul 
ana Lieu/~nanl~owmor 
Now. we the Chlels of the 
Conlederauon 01 the Hapus 01 New 
Zealand. here usembled ., 
WalWlBI.and we. the chie" 01 New 
Zealand. see the meaning 01 these 
WOrds and accepl them. and we 
agree 10 all of them. Here we put 
our names and our marks. 
I THE FOURTH ARTICLE I 
Two chwdunen.the Catholic 
Bishop. PompaJUer and the 
Anslian Mislionuy William 
Colenso rec:orded & discussIOn on 
whal we -.Jd eaII religious 
Ireedom and cusuomary law. In 
answer 10 & dUect question from 
PompaJller. HobIon aareect 10 the 
folloWlngllalemenL II wu read 10 
the meeting belore anyol\he <hie" 
had signed the TreaJy. 
E mea _ Ie Kawana lID nai 
whaIoapanoloatoo 01nprMo. 0 ngi 
. WeterianL 0 Roma. me Ie nlentla 
Moon hoIu e IiIJ<ina ngatahilia ell. 
Translation: 
The Governor uwlhatlhe several 
Ialths tbeliela I of EnSIand. of the 
W ... ~oIR.ome.andal ... Maon 
. customsllallalib be protected by 
him. 
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ENGLISH VERSION • 
I PREAMBLE I 
Her Majesty. Victoria. Queen 01 the United Kingdom 01 
Great Britaln and Ireland. regarding with her Royal 
Favour the Native Chiefs and Tribes 01 New Zealand. 
and anxious 10 protecl their just Rights and I'roperty. 
and to secure to tljem the enjoyment 01 Peace and Good 
Order. has deemed it necessary. in consequence 01 the 
great number 01 Her Majesty's Subjects who have 
already settled in l'IIew Zealand. and the "'Pid extension 
01 Emigration both lrom Europe and Australia which 
is still in progress. 10 constitute and appoint a 
lunctionary proPljrly authorised to \rUt with the 
Aborigines 01 New Zealand lor the recognition 01 Her 
Majesty's Sovereign authority over the whole or any 
IARTICLE THE FmSTI 
The chiels of the Confederation 
of the United Tribes of New 
Zealand and the separate and 
independent Chiels who have not 
become members of the 
Conlederation. cede to Her 
Majesty the Queen 01 England. 
absolutelv and without 
reservation. a1I,the rights and 
powers of Sovereignty wilich the 
said Confederation or Individual 
Chiels respectively exercise or 
possess. or may be supposeo to 
exercise or to possess over their 
respective Territories as the sole 
Sovereigns thereoi. 
I ARTICLE TIlE SECOND I 
Her Majesty the Queen of 
England confirms and guarantees 
10 the Chiefs and Tribes 01 New 
Zealand and 10 the respective 
families and individuafs thereof. 
the full exdusive and 
undisturbed possession of the 
Lands and Estates. Forests. 
Fi~enes. and other. properties 
which thev mav collectivelY or 
Individualiy po5ses5. 50 long as 
It Is their WISh and desire to 
maintain the same in their 
possession: but the Chiefs of the 
United Tribes and the Individual 
Chiefs ,yield to Her Malesty the 
exclUSive right of Pre-<!mpuon 
over such lands as the 
propnetors thereof maY be 
disposed 10 alienate. ai such 
prices as may be agreed upon 
between the respecuve 
proprietors and persons 
appointed by Her Majesty to treat 
with them in thai behaII. 
part 01 these islands. Her Majesty therefore being 
desirous to establish asettled form 01 Civil Government 
with a view to averting the evil consequences which 
must result from the absence 01 the necessary Laws 
and Institutions alike to the Native population and to 
Her Subjects has been graciously pleased to empower 
and authorise me William Hobson. a Captain in Her 
Majesty'sRoyaJ Navy. Consul. and Ueutenant-Govemor 
01 such parts 01 New Zealand as ~y be or hereafter 
shall be ceded to Her Majesty. to invite the confederated 
and Independent Chiefs of New Zealand to concur in 
the lollowlng Articles and Conditions. 
IARTICLE TIlE 11IIRD1 
In consideration thereol. Her 
Majesty the Queen of'England 
extends to the Natives 01 New 
Zealand Her Royal Protection 
and impartS to them all the Rights 
and Privileges 01 British subjeclS. 
W. Hobson. Ueut6lant-Gouemor 
Now themon!. We the Chlefs 01 
the Confederation of the United 
Tribes 01 New ZeaJand being 
assembled in Congress at 
Victoria-in Waitangiand We the 
Separate and Independent Chiefs 
01 New Zealand claiming 
authority over the Tribes and 
Territories which are specilied 
alter our respectiye names 
having been made fullv 10 
Wldentand the Provision 01 the 
loregoing Treaty. accepl and 
enter into the Sime.in the lull 
spirit and meaning thereol. In 
witness 01 which. we have . 
attached our signatures ormarJIs 
at the places and the dales 
respectively specified. 
Done at Waitangl. this lixlhday 
of Febl'llllY in the year 01 Our 
Lord. one thousand eillht 
iIwJd!'ed and forty. 
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Source: Kiser and ostrum (1982) 
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Appendix 3 Gazette notice declaring establishment of 85 
Fishery Management Areas in New Zealand 
Source: MAFFish 1989 
Extract from New Zealand Gazelle. Thursday, 27 April 1984, No. 68, page 1402 
No/irt DC'c:/aring Fishtr.I' ManagL'rnC'lI/ A,L'OS 
(Ag. 9/1/0/1: No. )131) 
PUR!iUANT to section 5 of the Fisheries Act. 1983,. I hereby declare 
the areas dcscribed in the Schedule to thiS nOIl~e to be fis.he~y 
management areas for the management of all spccles of fish wlthan 
those areas: 
Provided Ihat Ihis notice shall nol apply to-
(i} Those species of fish which are subj~ct" to foreign 
fishang cran opcrations pursuanl to Ihe Territorial Sca and 
Ellclusive Economic Zon,e Act 1977; or 
(ii) Those species of fish subject to the .Fisheries (Sea 
Fishing) Notice 1983, including su~h species. ~s may be 
included or Cllcludcd from' that nollce as nollfied by me 
from time to time in the Ga:C'/lC'; or ' 
(iii) Albacore tuna (Thunlll/S a/u/unga), bigeye tu~a 
(Thunnus obrsusl' skipjack tuna (KauuII'oIlUS pC'/all/u), 
slender luna (Alo/humllls !a/llll), soulhern blue~n tuna 
(T~unnus mocco."iI) and yellowfin tuna (7IIII'lIIuI 
a/bacarl's). 
SCHEDULE 
KERMAOEC FISHERY MANAGEMENT ARl!A 
ALL that area of New Zealand fisheri~ waten aro':lnd th~ Ke~adec 
Islands enclosed by a lin~ c.ommenesng at, a posnt 34,34.3 Sand 
179'51.0'W on the outer limits orthe exclUSive economic zone; and 
then proceed in. generally in an e~ste:rly, nonherly •. westerly an.d 
southerly directIOn along the outer hmlts of the CllcluSIV~ ~n.omle 
zone to a point 34'22.I'S and 179'29.6'E o~ the: outer b~lts ~f the 
ellclusive economic zone; and then proceedsng In a straight hne to 
the first-mentioned point. 
AUCKLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT AREA 
' .... :1"t area of New Zealand fisheries waten enclosed by a line 
mmenting at Tirua Point on the west coast of the Nonh Island 
iit 38'2)'S and 174'38.5'E); and the.n procecdi~g along a strai~ht 
line to the outer limits of the ellcluslve economic zone to ,a pomt 
37'35'5 and 170'O)'E: then procee~in~'in alenerally ~onherly an,d 
easlerly direction along the outer hmlls of the UclUSIVe: economic 
zone to • point 33'25'S and 177'59,4' E: then proceeding due South 
toCapc Runaway on the cast coast of the Nonh Island (at 37'32'S 
ind 177'59.4'E); thence in a generally nonhw~sterly and south-
easterly direction along the line of the mean high-water mark of 
the coast of the Nonh Island to the point of commencement. 
CENTRAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT AREA 
ALL that area of New Zealand fisheries waten enclosed by a line 
commencing at Capc Runaway on the east coast of the Nonh Island 
(at 37'32'5 and 177'59.4'E); then proceeding ~ue Nonh to • point 
at 33·25'S and 177·S9.4'E; then p'r~eedinl tn a le,!erally sout~­
easterly direction alonl the outcr limits of the CllcluSlv~ economic 
zonc to its intersection with the 42' 10'Sparallcl of latitude: then 
proceeding due West along latitude 42'IO'S 10 a point 42'10'5 and 
174'42'E; then proceeding in a straight line 10 a poinl 40'32'S and 
174'20'E: Ihen proceeding in a straighl line to a poinl on Ihe oute. 
limits of the ellclusive economic zone al 37'44'S amI 16')'56' E 
then proceeding in a generally nOrlherly direction along Ihe QUle, 
limits of the exclusive economic zone to a point at 37'35'S am 
170'03' E: then in a straighl linc 10 Tirua Poinl on the west coas 
of the Nonh Island (al 38'2)'S and 174'38.5'E); Ihen proceedin: 
in a generally SOUlherly, easterly. and norlherly direction along Ih. 
me;!n high-water mark of the coaSI of New Zealand to the point 0 
commencement, 
SOIlTlIERN FlstlEII" MANA(;t:MENT AIIE,\ 
AU'I that aru of New Zealand fisheries walers enclosed by a lin 
commencing at Clarence Poinl on Ihe east coast of the Soulh lsi an 
(at '42'10'5 and I 73'S6'E); 'and thence proceeding due East to th 
out!;r limits of the exclusive economic zone alon~ latitude 42' 10' ~ 
and Ithen proceeding in a generally southcrly Illrection along I~ 
outer limits of tlie cllelusive economic zone to latitude 46'S; the 
proceeding due West to a point 46'S and 172'E; Ihen procecdir 
duelSouth to a point 48')O'S and I 72'E: and then pron:cding dl 
West to a point 48')O'S and 169'E; then proceeding due Soulh 
a point 49'S and t69'E: then proceeding due West to Ihe oul 
limits of the ellelusive economic zone; then proceeding in a general 
nonherly dircction along the outer limits of the exclusive econom 
zone to a point 44'16'5 and 162'13'E; then procceding due Easl 
Awarua Point on the west coast of the South Island (at 44'I6'S a. 
16S'03'E); and then in a generally southerly, westerly, and northel 
direction along the line of the mean high-waler mark of the co; 
of the South Island 10 the point of commencement. 
SUII-ANTARClIC FtSIIERY MANA(;[MENT AIIEA 
ALL that area of New Zealand fisheries walers enclosed by a Ii 
, commencing on the outer limits of the exelusive:: economic zone 
a paint 46'S and 171'4YW: and then proceedmg due West Ie 
point 46'S and I 72'E; then proceeding due Soulh 10 a point 4S')C 
and 172'E; and then proceeding due West to a point 48'30'S a 
I 69'E: then proceeding due South to a point 49'5 and 169'E; t~ 
proceeding due West to the 0!lter limits of the cx~lus.ive eCQnor 
'zone at a point 49'S and 161 26' E; then proceedmg 10 a gencr, 
southe.rJy and nor~heasterly direction alon~ the ou~«=r limits of 
Cllclusive economic zone to, the first-mentioned pomt. 
CHALLENGER FISIIERY MANA<;EMI;NT ARI:'A 
ALL that area of New Zealand fisheries waters enclosed by a I 
commencing at Awarua Point on the west coast or the South lsi: 
(at 44'16'5 and 168'03'E); then proceeding due West along lalit, 
44'16'5 to the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone t 
point 44'I6'S and 162'13'E; then proceeding in a generally no' 
easterly direction along the outer limits of the exclusive ceo no, 
lone to a point 37'44'S and 169'S6'E; then proceeding in a slra; 
line to a point 40')2'S and 174'20'E; then proceedin~ in a str .. 
line to a point 42' 10' Sand 174'42' E; then proccedIRg due \I 
along latitude 42'IO'S 10 Clarence Point on the cast coaSI of 
South Island (at 42'IO'S and 17)'56'E): then proceeding i 
generall)' nonherly, westerly and southwesterly direction along 
mean high-water mark of the coast of the South Island to the p 
of commencement. 
Dated at Wellington this 18th day or April 1984. 
DUNCAN MAciNTYRE, Minister of Fisheri( 
--.-.~ ~'.--"---" ... -, i 
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flipendix 4 
I 
Phases of the Auckland Fishery ManagJment Plan 
Source: MAFFish 1986 
SUBSEQUENT PHASES OF THE AUCKLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN 
MAF proposes to initiate preliminary investigations and 
discussions on Phase II of the Auckland plan shortly after 
the release of Phase I as a proposed Fishery Management Plan. 
The following matters will be addressed in later phases of 
the plan: 
1. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Recreational fishing specific regional strategies 
will be developed from the national policy on marine 
recreational fishing in Phase II. 
Marine protected areas - regional policies and programmes 
for marine protected areas (marine teserves, parks, 
and habitat reserves) will be developed in conjunction 
with Phase II. As a result of delays with the revised 
legislation necessary for the implementation of any 
marine protected areas programme, it is I now appropriate 
to address this aspect in th~ next pha~e. 
Management of the rock lobster fishery. A discussion 
paper on options for future management of the rock lobster 
fishery was released in April 19861 . The management 
strategy for rock lobster will be developed on a national 
basis during Phase II from discussions on the options 
presented in this paper. 
Maori fisheries - the extent to which Maori fisheries 
are addressed in Phase II will deJ?end on progress with 
the national policy for Maori traditional fisheries. 
A two year timetable has been set for its development. 
It is hoped that Phase II will be developed within a 
considerably shorter time. Thus it may be necessary 
to address Maori fisheries in detail in a third phase. 
However, where possible Phase II of the FMP will address 
specific Maori concerns which need to be resolved as 
soon as possible. Many of these are expected to centre 
on conflicts with commercial fishing and the effects 
of local depletion on the ability of small Maori 
communi ties to catch fish for food. A general strategy 
for both of these issues has been developed for Phase 
I and will be refined during Phase II. 
Shellfish fisheries 
6. Seaweed fisheries. 
7. Freshwater fisheries, e.g. eels 
8. Marine farming. 
To meet the· requirements of the Fisheries Act, Phases II 
and III will be proposed as amendments to Phase I. At the 
same time management strategies proposed in Phase I will 
be reviewed and refined as necessary. For fisheries which 
are addressed only in general terms in Phase I, more specific 
strategies will be developed as knowledge of these fisheries 
4 "",,.c~e..~-
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